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vABSTRACT 
The Russian annexation of Crimea stimulated the author’s interest in 
researching the “little green men” (allegedly the Russian Spetsnaz) that appeared at a 
decisive point in the coup de main. The intent here is to understand the capabilities 
and limitations of the Russian special operations forces (SOF) and the level of threat 
they present to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and Russia’s 
neighbors. This study uses Colin Gray’s strategic utility theory to understand 
why Russian leaders choose unconventional warfare over conventional warfare, 
and how well the Spetsnaz execute assigned missions. Soviet and Russian military 
doctrines constitute a baseline for the evolution of Russian strategy and of Spetsnaz in 
parallel. Three case studies—Operation Danube in Czechoslovakia, the first and the 
second Chechen wars, and the annexation of Crimea—contribute to this research. 
Russian Spetsnaz per se are competent enough to fulfill their duties; however, they do 
not make up for poor planning, weak strategy, and general incompetence. When 
Russia has vigorous plans and a strong strategy, the Spetsnaz become an 
indispensable element. Thus, it behooves the decision makers of concerned countries 
to remain vigilant and take precautions and countermeasures to ensure the Spetsnaz 
will not surface in their nations’ capitals out of the blue. 
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I. THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF THE RUSSIAN SPETSNAZ 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Much research has been conducted on Russia’s activities along its borders and its 
diplomatic and territorial gains. However, very little research focuses on the Spetsnaz, 
spetsialnogo naznacheniya or Russian special forces, and virtually none focuses on their 
strategic utility. Given the fact that Russian troops have helped annex Crimea, operated in 
the other parts of Ukraine, and gained new bases and “warm water ports” in the Levant, 
one question arises: how has Spetsnaz been used to support Russia’s strategic interests? 
“Pro-Russians” were protesting before the invasion of Ukraine, and “little green 
men,” who took over the Crimean Legislature and several other key targets, played their 
roles flawlessly during the annexation. If these “little green men” were Spetsnaz, their 
clandestine conduct and their success are extremely intriguing. That said, questions 
emerged about the unknown: what is the role of the Spetsnaz in Russian policy, when did 
they start this operation, what were the phases of the operation, how does Russia define 
special operations and special forces, what is their organizational structure, how do they 
operate, and what position does the Spetsnaz hold in Russia’s bureaucracy?  
To clarify the scope of this research, insights on how and to what extent Russia 
employs the Spetsnaz are pursued. Specifically, this thesis tries to find out how the 
Spetsnaz shaped the battlefield in the early phases of several conflicts and how they 
performed. Russian operations in the annexation of Crimea constitute the main focus of 
this research. Soviet-era “active measures” are reviewed to determine if these techniques 
have been revived by the Russian Federation. 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE  
This research has three purposes: first, to illuminate the pattern that leads Russian 
political and military decision makers to employ special operations; second, to examine 
the strategic utility of the Russian special operations forces; and third, to increase 
awareness for decision makers in NATO, and Turkey in particular, of the potential 
unconventional warfare threat emanating from Russia. In addition to the annexation of 
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Crimea, this thesis includes comparative case studies dating back to the founding of the 
Russian Spetsnaz in 1950. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
(1) What are the conditions for, and indicators of, Russian special operations 
forces’ employment in support of Russian national objectives? (2) What are the 
capabilities and limitations of the Russian Spetsnaz to conduct covert operations in 
unconventional warfare? 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
In a RAND corporation translation of Soviet Military Strategy, written by V. D. 
Sokolovskii and published in 1963, there is an unambiguous conclusion that has been 
proven wrong by the successor of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation: “a future 
world war will require massive armed forces.”1 The conflicts in which Russia has 
participated since the end of the Soviet Union have proved that relatively small numbers 
of special operations forces may play crucial roles in resolving a conflict in favor of the 
employing country’s foreign policy objectives and its grand strategy. In Russia’s case, 
such special operations forces include Spetsnaz—the “little green men” who allegedly 
appeared at the decisive point of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
This thesis explores Colin Gray’s theory of “the strategic utility of special 
operations”2 by focusing specifically on the utility of the Russian Spetsnaz in the context 
of the Russian military strategy. Therefore, the literature about both the theory of 
strategic utility and the Russian Spetsnaz are in consideration. The actions of the Russian 
Spetsnaz in Chechnya during the Chechen wars; in Georgia, during the annexation of 
Crimea; and in Eastern Ukraine constitute the main focus of the examination of the 
strategic utility of the Russian Spetsnaz. Also, two main campaigns in the Soviet era after 
                                                 
1 V. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, trans. Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gouré, and Thomas 
W. Wolfe, The RAND Corporation Translation (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 311. 
2 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 164–88. 
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World War II, in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, contribute to understanding whether 
there are any similar patterns prevailing today.  
Little research has been conducted on the strategic utility of the Russian Spetsnaz. 
However, one should note that there is also little written on the strategic utility of special 
operations forces in general. Gray corroborates the inadequacy of this literature after 
assessing David Thomas’s article, “Importance of Commando Operations in Modern 
Warfare, 1939–82” and McRaven’s, Spec Ops. Gray viewed Thomas’s article as the 
closest in spirit and purpose to his analysis, while he thought McRaven’s Spec Ops was 
completely deprived of strategic reasoning. Gray concludes that, “[a]side from scattered 
comments or a bold sentence at the conclusion of a work of history, there is practically no 
literature on the subject of the strategic utility of special operations.”3 Gray, in that 
regard, is the first to mention the strategic utility of special operations forces (SOF). 
To make the contribution of special operations to national objectives measurable, 
Gray categorizes the tasks special operations forces may pursue into four groups: 
 Tasks that only special operations forces can perform 
 Tasks that special operations forces can do well 
 Tasks that special operations forces tend to do badly 
 Tasks that special operations forces cannot perform at all4 
It is important to acknowledge that some tasks are suitable for SOF and some are not by 
either the nature of the tasks or the nature of the special operations forces. This 
acknowledgement sheds light on the assessment of the strategic utility of the Russian 
Spetsnaz. Furthermore, Gray groups the “economy of force” and the “expansion of 
choice” as the master claims of the strategic utility of special operations and 
“innovation,” “morale,” “showcasing of competence,” “reassurance,” “humiliation of the 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 153. 
4 Ibid. 
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enemy,” “control of escalation,” and “shaping the future” as the “other claims” of the 
strategic utility of special operations.5 
By comparison, Ross Kelly’s treatment of strategic utility in his book Special 
Operations & National Purpose,6 which was published in 1989, nine years earlier than 
Gray’s Explorations in Strategy, is similar to Gray’s theory. However, Kelly does not 
directly mention the strategic utility of special operations. Instead, he analyzes the special 
operations forces of NATO members and the “special purpose forces” of Warsaw Pact 
members both in the alliances’ contexts and the countries’ own national purposes as a 
policy tool. He also examines the Soviet regime’s use of Spetsnaz, which may give 
insight on how the Russian Spetsnaz is employed in today’s conflicts. Kelly’s analyses in 
his comprehensive work may fall under Gray’s category of “expansion of choice” for 
respective countries, as the former’s conclusion leads to how special operations forces 
would achieve their missions rather than how their missions would contribute to the main 
effort. 
In this respect, the mainstream arguments about the use of special operations 
forces mostly correspond to Kelly’s treatment—vaguely asserting how special operations 
forces can fulfill the requirements of special operations better. Whether those arguments 
assert that special operations produce strategic outcomes or not, their main focus mostly 
stays at a tactical level. Respectively, McRaven7 in 1996, Marquis8 in 1997, and Adams9 
in 1998 contribute to the literature of special operations and special operations forces, but 
neither mentioned SOF’s strategic utility. Among the four authors, Kelly has the closest 
analysis to Gray’s theory without using the term “strategic utility.” 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 168–80. 
6 Ross S. Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose, Issues in Low-Intensity Conflict Series 
(Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1989). 
7 William H McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice 
(New York: Ballantine Books, Random House Publishing Group, 1996). 
8 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces, The 
Rediscovering Government Series (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997). 
9 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998). 
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On the other hand, the literature on the Russian Spetsnaz mostly clusters around 
either earlier research on the modernization of Russian military or the contemporary 
research on the “Gerasimov Doctrine” and its implications for Spetsnaz. In addition, there 
are several reports on the organizational structure and defects of Russian special forces. 
The most recent and most relevant research on the subject are Mark Galeotti’s, Spetsnaz: 
Russia’s Special Forces,10 which is an explanatory book illustrated by Johnny Shumate; 
Tor Bukkvoll’s, “Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government—the Case of 
Russian Special Operations Forces,”11 an article that studies the reforms in the Russian 
special operations forces after 2008, the period which Galeotti refers to as the modern 
Spetsnaz; and Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine12 edited by 
Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov. Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in 
Ukraine is the most comprehensive work with a focus on operations in Ukraine. 
However, to reiterate, none of the works on Spetsnaz focuses on strategic utility.  
Earlier works on the Spetsnaz include Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet 
Special Forces by Viktor Suvorov,13 and Inside Spetsnaz: Soviet Special Operations: A 
Critical Analysis, edited by William H. Burgess III.14 Some consider Suvorov’s book a 
non-academic work. Suvorov credits the military Spetsnaz as the main executor of nearly 
every remarkable external operation rather than the KGB Spetsnaz.15 To balance his 
claims, the other book, Inside Spetsnaz, reads otherwise. It gives credit to the KGB as the 
superior of the GRU. Aside from some controversial nuances and lack of proof for some 
                                                 
10 Mark Galeotti and Johnny Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, ed. Martin Windrow, Elite 
206 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2015). 
11 Tor Bukkvoll, “Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government – the Case of Russian Special 
Operations Forces,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 5 (July 29, 2015): 602–25, 
doi:10.1080/01402390.2015.1056342. 
12 Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, eds., Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine 
(Minneapolis: East View Press, 2014). 
13 Viktor Suvorov, Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces, First American Edition 
(New York: Norton, 1988). 
14 Kirsten Amundsen et al., Inside Spetsnaz: Soviet Special Operations: A Critical Analysis, ed. 
William H. Burgess III (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990). 
15 Suvorov, Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces, 4–9. 
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of Suvorov’s claims, both books are good sources for a general portrait of the emergence 
of Spetsnaz as an indispensable element in the Soviet statecraft.  
The lack of research on more recent conflicts may be the outcome of the state of 
confusion that the actions of the Russian Spetsnaz caused, leaving the rest of the world 
with an unanswered rhetorical question: now what? Or, the myth they have created may 
focus more attention on the Spetsnaz, per se, than their strategic utility, and the latter may 
require retaliation or reaction. Russia’s permanent seat in the United Nations Security 
Council and “below-the-threshold of the Article 5” political and military actions provided 
excuses to NATO that was neither ready nor willing to act against Russia’s expansion. 
The reluctance of NATO to react may be regarded as the collapse of deterrence. Janice 
Gross Stein explains the collapse of deterrence in her 2008 article with the following five 
principles: 
 Challenger’s assessment of the balance of interests, 
 A challenger may abstain from the use of force if its leaders see a 
reasonable alternative to military action. 
 The challenger’s estimate of the probability of military success, 
 The attitudes of allies and military suppliers, 
 The challenger’s comparative calculation of loss.16 
Then there is the “Gerasimov Doctrine” itself, and reviews of it by several pundits, 
contribute to understanding Russian attempts to test NATO’s response, as well as 
Russia’s approach to employing special forces to achieve strategic objectives.17 
Considering the existing literature on the strategic utility of SOF, the Spetsnaz, 
and the Russian national strategy and military doctrine, this thesis intends to contribute to 
the literature by investigating Gray’s strategic utility theory as it relates to Russian 
                                                 
16 Janice Gross Stein, “Military Deception, Strategic Surprise, and Conventional Deterrence: A 
Political Analysis of Egypt and Israel, 1971–73,” Journal of Strategic Studies 5, no. 1 (March 1982): 94–
121, doi:10.1080/01402398208437103. 
17 Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review, February 2016, 30–38; Mark 




Spetsnaz, as well as to examine the Russian national security strategy, foreign policy, 
military doctrine, and the objectives that the Spetsnaz accomplished, in order to combine 
the theory and practice.  
E. HYPOTHESES 
There are two hypotheses this research seeks to test.  
1. Hypothesis-1  
Russian political and military decision makers choose unconventional warfare 
over conventional warfare when the following three conditions exist: 
 The balance of interests in the target is in favor of Russia, 
 Conventional warfare would instigate a reaction by NATO, 
 The probability of success by unconventional means is high. 
The third condition requires competent special operations forces and leads to the 
second hypothesis. 
2. Hypothesis-2 
Spetsnaz produce a strategic outcome when they conduct covert operations in 
unconventional warfare.  
F. APPROACH 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the strategic utility of Russian Spetsnaz. This 
exploration will also illuminate the unique conditions that lead Russian decision makers 
to choose covert operations to accomplish strategic objectives, and the Spetsnaz’s 
capabilities and limitations to conduct such operations. Colin Gray’s theory of “the 
strategic utility of special operations”18 is applied to the following selected cases to 
examine the significance of the Spetsnaz to Russian strategic purposes. Conclusions and 
                                                 
18 Gray, Explorations in Strategy. 
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recommendations are intended to inform decision makers in NATO and Turkey about the 
potential threat emanating from Russia.  
The research is motivated by the nearly bloodless Russian annexation of Crimea. 
This thesis examines conflicts in which the Spetsnaz have been employed since their 
formal founding in 195019 and analyzes selected conflicts in retrospect for a better 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of unconventional warfare. These 
conflicts are selected to study the adaptation of Russian special warfare, especially 
unconventional warfare, and special operations forces in the context of the respective 
times. Another driving factor is the availability of adequate sources. The selected cases 
include Operation Danube in Czechoslovakia, the first and the second Chechen wars in 
Chechnya, and the annexation of Crimea. Additional data is derived from: Operation 
Storm-333 and the decade-long follow-up operations in Afghanistan, conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and ongoing clashes in the Donbas region in 
Ukraine. The selection of these campaigns aims to identify patterns of Soviet and post-
Soviet era employment of Spetsnaz. 
Although the Spetsnaz were also deployed to Hungary, Angola, Ethiopia, Cuba, 
Tajikistan, and many other places, their respective roles were significantly different from 
those in the above cases and therefore not considered in this study. In addition, the 
presence of the Spetsnaz and the strategic targets of the Russian intervention in Syria are 
still ongoing. Thus, operations in Syria are excluded from this research project.  
In his book Explorations in Strategy, Gray mentions “the importance of 
considering special operations and special operations forces strategically in relation to a 
war or conflict as a whole.”20 Therefore, each case comprises the following components. 
The contemporary political context and the military doctrine are examined to discern the 
strategic objectives of the conflict and the selection of unconventional warfare as a policy 
tool. This also helps test the first hypothesis. Then, to test the second hypothesis, the 
conducted special operations is analyzed, and the capabilities and limitations of the 
                                                 
19 Galeotti and Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, 6. 
20 Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 143. 
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Spetsnaz are assessed. The chronology of the conflict is followed to uncover the 
indicators of an ongoing unconventional war. Finally, the strategic utility of the special 
operations and the special operations forces’ contribution to the overall campaign are 
analyzed.  
To recap, first, the contemporary military doctrine and unique conditions that lead 
to the selection of unconventional warfare as a policy tool are examined. Second, the 
covert actions the Spetsnaz performed during selected campaigns are derived, and the 
indicators that occurred simultaneously or before the action are uncovered. Finally, the 
strategic utility of the special operations and the utility of the Spetsnaz to the overall 
Russian military strategy and Russian national purpose are assessed. The conclusion aims 
to raise awareness of the strategic utility of the Russian Spetsnaz and its implications for 
Russia’s opponents. Hopefully, political and military decision makers of NATO and 
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II. THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN 
RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE AND GRAND STRATEGY 
AFTER WORLD WAR II 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the military doctrine, perceived threat, and their 
implications for Spetsnaz in the Soviet era starting with Khrushchev, continuing with 
Brezhnev, and ending with Gorbachev; then it continues with the post-Soviet era, starting 
with Yeltsin and ending with the Putin administration. The aim of this chapter is to 
understand how Russian military strategy has evolved from Soviet era, resulting in the 
increased use of SOF. The strategic discourse in Russian military literature after World 
War II (WWII) was shaped by the Soviet Union’s Cold War enemy, the United States. 
The only thing that remains constant is Russia’s goal of preventing a direct confrontation 
with the West, while supporting, if not instigating, “national liberation struggles 
including guerrilla and proxy forces.”21 To not provoke the West and succeed in their 
national objectives, the Russians emphasize special operations.  
The implications of the Soviet and Russian military doctrines and perceived threat 
materialized in the tasks given to SOF. As Kelly Ross writes, Soviet special operations 
include: 
Assassination of enemy political and military leaders during periods just 
prior to or immediately upon initiation of hostilities or other armed 
action… Destruction of nuclear weapons sites, airfields, command and 
control centers, ammunition dumps, fuel storage and pipeline facilities, 
and power generating and transmission structures… Strategic 
reconnaissance and target designation… Support for airmobile or airborne 
operations… Organization of stay-behind forces for partisan 
operations…22 
Tor Bukkvoll lists the tasks of Russian special operations forces in a generalized manner: 
 Raids and sabotage 
                                                 
21 Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, 49. 
22 Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose, 80–81. 
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 Special reconnaissance 
 Combating enemy SOF 
 Psychological operations 
 Military assistance 
 Support for one’s own non-SOF forces 
 Search and rescue operations 
 Peace support operations23 
Interestingly, there is little difference between current Russian and Western SOF tasks. 
The Soviet and Russian military doctrines help the military stay alert for 
perceived threats. As Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott suggest, the military 
doctrine guides the High Command to produce military strategies.24 Holloway argues 
that “the emphasis placed on [the role of the military power in Soviet foreign policy] is a 
consequence not only of the Russian and Soviet experience, but also of the international 
context of Soviet development.”25 He also suggests that both political and military points 
of view are projected in Soviet military doctrine as a credible source to gain insight into 
Soviet strategic behavior.26 Therefore, the Soviet military doctrine adapted to both 
domestic and international developments; feeding on military doctrine, Soviet decision-
makers made “appropriate policies and decisions … concerning strategy, force structure, 
training, and the like.”27 In accordance with those policies and decisions, the use of 
strategic forces came into play as the Soviet and then the Russian leaders needed to calm 
their respective enemies.  
                                                 
23 Bukkvoll, “Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government – the Case of Russian Special 
Operations Forces,” 606. 
24 Harriet Fast Scott and William Fontaine Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, 3rd ed., and updated 
(Boulder, CO: London: Westview Press; Arms and Armour Press, 1984), 397. 
25 David Holloway, “Military Power and Political Purpose in Soviet Policy,” Daedalus 109, no. 4 
(1980): 28, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024694. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, 10–11. 
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Should the West start a world war, as Sokolovskii claims as “one of the important 
tenets of Soviet military doctrine,” it “will inevitably assume the character of a nuclear 
war with missiles, i.e., a war in which the nuclear weapon will be the chief instrument of 
destruction, and missiles the basic vehicle for their delivery to target.”28 With regard to 
that nuclear threat, the Soviets first introduced their “Strategic Missile Forces” to the 
battlefield to: 
be used to carry out the main missions of war: the destruction of the 
aggressor’s means of nuclear attack—the basis of his military power—and 
the defeat of the main formations of his armed forces, as well as the 
destruction of the basic, vitally important enemy targets.29 
The strategic use of SOF units gained importance as late as 1956, as Soviet leaders 
realized the use of nuclear missiles at any proportion would spread throughout the 
globe.30 As the perceived threat changed from nuclear armament to loss of Party control 
over the Soviet bloc, “national liberation” wars and the Soviet role of “fraternal 
assistance” rose as the alternative way of influencing the governments of the Soviet 
sphere.31 Thus, military advisors and stay-behind soldiers to support insurgencies gained 
importance. By means of the Spetsnaz, the Soviets both militarily advised pro-Soviet 
governments’ forces and trained guerrilla forces or indigenous rebels to topple anti-
Soviet ones. As time went by, the Spetsnaz became an indispensable element in Soviet 
statecraft. After the Soviet Union collapsed, economic stagnation increased the 
importance of the small units. However, they were used as a skeleton key in some 
conflicts to make up for the general incompetence of the Russian military. This did not 
help Russia solve strategic issues. Then, as Gerasimov Doctrine shows, Russians learned 
to integrate the Spetsnaz with conventional forces. 32 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 299. 
29 Ibid., 298. 
30 Galeotti and Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, 15. 
31 Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy, New Cold 
War History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 95. 
32 The “Gerasimov Doctrine” was widely acknowledged after the 2013 article by Russian Chief of the 
General Staff Valery Gerasimov published in a Russian military journal, the Military Industrial Courier. 
 14
The latest actions of Russia, especially the annexation of Crimea, involve high 
dependency on the Spetsnaz at decisive points that shows the implications of the 
Gerasimov Doctrine, and the importance it reveals for special operations to fulfill 
Russian strategic objectives.33 As mentioned above, the contribution of military doctrine 
to Russian statecraft precedes the current Gerasimov Doctrine. However, the Gerasimov 
Doctrine is a clear articulation of past, current, and likely future Russian strategy and 
contributes to the overall work. Lastly, the strategic utility of the special operations from 
the Russian perspective is examined based on Colin Gray’s theory of the strategic utility 
of special operations.34  
B. POST-WORLD WAR II SOVIET ERA 
During the Khrushchev era, nuclear deterrence was the main concern and the 
Spetsnaz did not draw much attention until the Brezhnev era. Effective use of the 
Spetsnaz started in the Brezhnev administration and then increased during the Gorbachev 
administration. During the transition from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, Yuri V. Andropov 
played an important part, as Galeotti writes, “in the evolution of the Spetsnaz from a 
military to a politico-military force.”35 In addition, the Soviets evidently used the 
Spetsnaz in Hungary, Cuba, North Korea, several African countries, Czechoslovakia, and 
Afghanistan.36 The Spetsnaz performed several roles in those countries from providing 
foreign military assistance to direct action. Specifically, the invasions of Czechoslovakia 
and Afghanistan provide examples of the Spetsnaz’s employment as the “tip of the spear” 
in pursuit of the national purpose specified in the Brezhnev Doctrine,37 which was 
produced to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia.38  
                                                 
33 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, 
July 6, 2014, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-
non-linear-war/. 
34 Gray, Explorations in Strategy. 
35 Galeotti and Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, 15. 
36 Ibid., 4–5. 
37 See “2. Brezhnev” on pages 17-19 of this thesis for further information on the Brezhnev Doctrine. 
38 Galeotti and Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, 4, 15–16. 
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1. Khrushchev 
The victory shared by the allied forces after WWII brought about new animosities 
instead of peace for the Soviet Union, thus shattering its security perception. The 
emergence of a new cross-continental dominant power, the United States, worried the 
Soviet Union. The expanding ideology of capitalism would limit the Soviet Union’s 
playground in Eurasia. Furthermore, with regard to a shrinking defense budget, 
Khrushchev tried to put more emphasis on weapon systems to challenge the West and 
tried to cut military personnel strength.39 However, Khrushchev’s plans instigated a 
discussion between two schools of thought within the military about future wars. The first 
group, the radicals, shared Khrushchev’s viewpoint that future wars, based on the 
adherents’ scientific prediction, would include a decisive use of nuclear weapons in the 
initial period of war. Therefore, maintaining a massive army in peace time would be 
uneconomical and unnecessary. The second group, the traditionalists, accused the 
radicals of not being realistic and chose to act cautiously based on a generalized 
experience of past wars, thus emphasizing the importance of multi-million-man armies.40  
The traditionalists predominated despite Khrushchev’s opposing views, and since 
they had neglected the utility of special operations, the Soviet Union took conventional 
precautions to preserve the balance of power. They raised million-man armies and 
consolidated the Soviet military presence all around the world. This upgraded the Soviet 
position from regional power to a world superpower. As a result of the traditionalists’ 
victory, the strategy of the Soviet Union during the rest of Cold War had two main 
components: one component was to prevent a general nuclear war that would cause 
mutual destruction; the other component was to reduce casualties and win the war, should 
the West start it. According to David Holloway, ensuring the former was incumbent upon 
                                                 
39 “Khrushchev announced a reduction of 1,200,000 from a total of 3,623,000 men in the Soviet armed 
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40 Colonel N. Sushko et al., “The Development of Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War under Modern 
Conditions,” Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), No. 18(September 1961): 
27–28, cited in Ibid., 21. 
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the Party leaders, and ensuring the latter was incumbent upon the High Command.41 With 
regard to preventing a general nuclear war, the main emphasis remained on the 
conventional units, and the Spetsnaz supported million-man armies, mostly by 
conducting strategic reconnaissance operations.42 
The first Soviet military doctrine enunciated by Khrushchev was shaped mostly 
around a weak combination of radical and traditionalist schools of thought, which 
essentially combined conventional and unconventional means. The use of SOF, as 
mentioned above, was mostly limited to the long-range reconnaissance of nuclear sites. 
With regard to the other aspects of power projection, Malinovskii, Marshal and Defense 
Minister of the Soviet Union realized the importance of nuclear weapons as a deterrent, 
as did Khrushchev. However, unlike Khrushchev, Malinovskii never gave up the standing 
mass ground forces. For him, the victorious end state could only be achieved by, as 
Holloway writes, “combined action of all arms and services,” probably including the 
Spetsnaz.43 As Sokolovskii suggests, the post-Stalin-era strategy therefore incorporated 
both “Khrushchev’s ‘new strategy’ prospectus of January 1960 and Malinovskii’s outline 
of a Soviet military doctrine at the [22]nd Congress a year and a half later.”44 The first 
doctrine remained effective until the middle of the 1970s, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa 
suggests it had three foundational concepts: preemption or a devastating retaliation of a 
latent nuclear attack; both qualitative and quantitative military superiority; and an 
ultimate nuclear attack that would harm the Soviet Union, but would bring the West its 
own demise.45 The first two concepts are essential for the third one to happen. However, 
since the absolute consequences of a nuclear attack would be unknown, assured mutual 
destruction and its effects on deterrence aside, Khrushchev’s threat alone was not 
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credible.46 “Later,” as the U.S. editors of the Soviet Military Doctrine, Dinerstein, Gouré, 
and Wolfe suggested, “with regard to Cuba in the fall of 1962[,] the threat of Soviet pre-
emption failed to meet the credibility test, with consequent damage to Soviet political 
strategy.”47 That gave the U.S. the upper hand in the competition. 
2. Brezhnev 
The West became more powerful at the Soviet Union’s expense through the end 
of the Khrushchev era. As Holloway suggests, “[t]he Brezhnev leadership inherited from 
Khrushchev a considerable inferiority in strategic forces.”48 However, to pursue a path to 
victory became the national purpose; thus, “[a] determined effort brought strategic parity 
with the United States by the late 1960s (and parity remains the public Soviet description 
of the strategic balance).”49 The narrative of the necessity to achieve strategic superiority 
over the West in the Khrushchev era evolved into a debate over nuclear proliferation and 
an arms race versus achieving strategic parity. Holloway mentions that “the choice the 
Soviet leaders faced was not one between parity and superiority (for superiority is clearly 
desirable), but between parity and a dangerous competition for superiority, the outcome 
of which was by no means certain.”50 Afterward, to defuse the tension, Brezhnev 
signaled that the aim of the Soviet Union was not superiority.51 While conducting 
strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the West to reach a détente, Brezhnev 
changed the focal point of military efforts to maintain limited national sovereignty and 
                                                 
46 “Khrushchev threatened that the USSR had the missile-nuclear capability to ‘wipe from the face of 
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47 Ibid., 65. 
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50 Ibid., 22. 
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absolute Soviet control on the socialist bloc.52 Until Brezhnev’s death, the main focus 
was to prevent a direct confrontation with the West, while consolidating power on its 
periphery. To control the near-abroad while keeping a balanced tension with the West, 
the Brezhnev administration depended highly upon surprise military interventions, which 
is made possible mostly by the Spetsnaz. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 
postwar justification of the invasion ultimately created the Brezhnev Doctrine, which 
simply stated that the Soviet Union would take precautions in the event a Soviet Bloc 
country would drift away from communist ideology.53 The Brezhnev Doctrine also 
justified the invasion of Afghanistan as it moved in a capitalist direction, even if it was 
not a Soviet Bloc country.54 After Brezhnev died in 1982, doctrinal changes started to 
emerge, but the repercussions of the infamous Brezhnev Doctrine lingered until late in 
the Gorbachev era.  
The need for a force that would satisfy the stealth requirement of Brezhnev’s 
grand strategy during Russian campaigns necessitated the use of SOF-capable units. 
Matthew J. Ouimet, an expert on Russia and Eurasia in the U.S. State Department, 
suggests that, “[t]he intrinsic weakness of this new Brezhnev Doctrine, however, was its 
reliance on force and stealth to solve political problems.”55 Increasing stealth, surprise, 
and speed requirements, along with economic deficiency, positioned the Spetsnaz as the 
top Soviet politico-military tool.56 During Brezhnev’s tenure, Spetsnaz units proved their 
ability to accomplish given objectives in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. 
3. Gorbachev 
The Spetsnaz did not operate alone in Afghanistan. As a result, military 
expenditures increased dramatically as Soviet military presence expanded. The Brezhnev 
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era was over. He died in 1982, and Yuri Andropov replaced him. In the transition from 
the Brezhnev era to the Gorbachev era, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko ruled 
the Soviet Union for short terms, fifteen months and twelve months, respectively. Unlike 
Brezhnev, Gorbachev gradually retreated from the assertive use of military power in 
eastern Europe. Ronald D. Asmus, J. F. Brown, and Keith Crane assert that Gorbachev 
shattered the foundations of the preceding Soviet policy, but “he failed to replace them 
with a viable alternative."57 Gorbachev inherited a bad economy and a stalemate in the 
Afghan War that started during Brezhnev’s tenure, and he needed a policy change to 
ameliorate those conditions. The obligatory shift from Brezhnev’s policy of limited 
sovereignty to aligned nations to Gorbachev’s “new thinking” in foreign policy mainly 
resulted from, as Ouimet suggests, “the sudden collapse of relations with the United 
States, economic stagnation, declining international prestige, and a military stalemate in 
the mountains of Afghanistan.”58 In order to meet the criteria of Gorbachev’s “new 
thinking,” the Spetsnaz stood out as the most viable instrument of foreign policy. 
To decrease the economic effects of the Afghan War and break the stalemate in 
the Soviets’ favor, more Spetsnaz units were introduced to the battlefield with an 
enhanced spectrum of missions. Galeotti claims that the 5 percent ratio of the Spetsnaz to 
ground troops in the beginning of the war increased to 20 percent towards the end.59 
However, the efforts to win the Afghan War did not help the Soviet Union heal all its 
wounds. Nonetheless, the Afghan War added more to the Spetsnaz’s toolbox. As Galeotti 
suggests, the Spetsnaz became “a versatile, fast-moving, and hard-hitting force that could 
do more than just deep reconnaissance and sabotage.”60 They also proved competent in 
“counterinsurgency, ambush, rapid-response, and covert operations.”61 Consequently, 
that increased the reliability of the Spetsnaz for the Soviet higher echelons. 
                                                 
57 Ronald D. Asmus, J. F. Brown, and Keith Crane, Soviet Foreign Policy and the Revolutions of 1989 
in Eastern Europe (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1991), 1–2. 
58 Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy, 243. 
59 Galeotti and Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, 22. 
60 Ibid., 28. 
61 Ibid. 
 20
The lack of appropriate means to resuscitate the status quo ante ultimately 
brought about the contraction of the Soviet Union’s borders. Just a few years later, social 
democracies had taken the place of the Soviet communist regimes, most of which were 
deemed to be Soviet stooges, throughout Eurasia. Consequently, the unavoidable collapse 
of the Soviet Union entailed a new unipolar world order. The Russian Federation 
emerged as the successor of the Soviet legacy, yet was downgraded to a regional power. 
Henceforth, the United States has remained the only superpower.  
C. POST-SOVIET ERA 
This part examines the post-Soviet era. There have been differences between the 
legacy of the Soviet and Russian history. There are also considerable similarities with the 
old and new practices and perceptions of the West and in the countermeasures used to 
maintain security in the post-Soviet era.62 
1. Yeltsin 
After a long period of decline, Russian statecraft was further crippled in a period 
of stagnation during the first president, Boris Yeltsin, which negatively impacted the 
success of the Spetsnaz along with other fighting units in the First Chechen War. Mark 
Galeotti argues that “President Boris Yeltsin (1991–99) seems to have had little real 
notion of the kind of Russia he wanted and a rapid turn-over of elites, advisers and 
courtiers also militated against the emergence of any such sustained vision.”63 Yeltsin’s 
lack of trust in his inner circle, combined with economic downturn, caused personnel 
problems for the Spetsnaz.64 
The military strategy to provide security constituted no more than brute 
reactionary countermeasures to uprisings in order to prevent further instabilities and 
territory losses. Those reactionary countermeasures proved an insufficient way of dealing 
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with conflicts when the Russians brutally captured Grozny and lost it two years later to 
the Chechen rebels. Surprisingly, in February 1994, nearly ten months before the war, all 
remaining veterans who had experience in urban fighting retired.65 Compared to other 
fighting units, only the Spetsnaz had better training and equipment. However, the 
reactionary approach that caught the army unprepared did not let the Spetsnaz make up 
for the general military incompetence. 
The Russians learned from their mistakes in the First Chechen War and launched 
the second campaign with more emphasis on Spetsnaz. Although the Second Chechen 
War proved more successful than the first based on better employment of Spetsnaz along 
with other Russian forces, it also sparked controversial debates its overall success. A 
bloody hostage rescue operation shattered world opinion about the Russian antiterrorist 
campaign. Other than domestic conflicts, the lack of sustainable vision caused ebbs and 
flows in relations with NATO. Furthermore, the military reform process that started in 
the nuclear age with Khrushchev was mostly suspended.66 
2. Putin 
The strategic parity that eroded during Gorbachev’s tenure completely vanished in 
the Yeltsin era. Yeltsin later seemed to be a placeholder and his era seemed to be a 
transition period that lasted until a more powerful ruler who could regenerate the old 
power of the sublime Soviet Union took office. His successor, Vladimir Putin, put the 
country on the track for military reforms and started to proactively produce 
countermeasures to domestic threats and to threats from the West. He kept security 
responsibility in his own hands when he handed power to Medvedev. Medvedev’s efforts 
for a more accountable, democratic-like approach to security affairs turned out to be 
insufficient when Putin took the presidency back.67 Unlike Yeltsin’s reactionary 
defensive approach, Putin took a proactive, if not offensive, approach to security issues. 
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He followed a practice that indicated the security of the Motherland entailed the security 
of the contiguous countries. The modernization of both the army’s structure and 
equipment, besides the new, all-inclusive employment of vast means to achieve more 
unified national objectives, put new terms such as “hybrid warfare” into the doctrine, and 
concerns about Russia’s status in world affairs escalated. 
The ambiguous use of military and non-military means below NATO’s Article 
Five threshold and high emphasis on unconventional warfare in the areas of Russian 
interest blurred the line between peace and war and paralyzed the West, resulting in 
insufficient reaction.68 With Putin’s security measures, the Russian military started to 
make formidable territorial gains in the former controlled areas of the Soviet Union, with 
a considerable facilitation of Russian Spetsnaz. The Second Chechen War, the conflict in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing war in the 
Donbass region of Ukraine would exemplify Putin’s wars. While Putin’s wars were 
ongoing, the Russian military underwent military reform. The Russian military reform, 
which was initiated by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov after the conflict in Georgia 
in 2008, was continued under his successor Sergei Shoigu, and was accelerated later by 
Gen. Gerasimov, surfaced with new equipment for special operators during the Crimean 
conflict.69 The previously acknowledged article by Gerasimov insinuates what Russia’s 
new approach to security issues would be in the near future and is examined next. 
Significantly, the “Gerasimov Doctrine” perpetuates the Soviet tradition by identically 
including perceived threats, future war predictions, political approaches to world affairs, 
and military-technical aspects of countermeasures to win future wars. 
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3. The “Gerasimov Doctrine” 
The portents of the special operations campaign conducted in Crimea in 2013 lie 
between the lines of the Gerasimov Doctrine and point out the new Russian strategy.70 In 
particular, two of Gerasimov’s points reflect on special operations and the use of SOF in 
Crimea. First, the covert actions of SOF, combined with active information and counter-
information operations, supplement the use of non-military means to achieve political and 
strategic goals. Second, the use of SOF and indigenous opposition forces create a 
permanently active front through the entire territory of the target state, and establishes the 
means to carry out asymmetrical actions that nullify the target’s advantages. In light of 
these ideas, all other strategic plans that refer to mass frontal confrontation belong to the 
past, and the need for new tactics for future operations highlights the evolving importance 
of SOF. 
The Gerasimov model resuscitates the Soviet practices used in Czechoslovakia 
and Afghanistan in a modernized fashion with nuances. Actions to start a war without 
declaring it, may signal a return to the Soviet era in Russian foreign policy and jeopardize 
small neighbors rooted to the Soviet soil. The model also discloses the Russian 
perception of the tactics employed by the West in color revolutions as an excuse to 
reinvigorate similar tactics and techniques to achieve political ends. Bluntly, blame is on 
the West for what Russia would do in Crimea and Ukraine, and maybe Moldova, 
Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia. 
What happened in Crimea puts Gerasimov’s model into practice and tested the 
quality of modernized SOF units. The actions were conducted by the Russian Spetsnaz 
and Naval Infantry in an obscure fashion, and what actually happened was unveiled after 
the victory. Consequently, the fait accompli paralyzed any mechanisms that could have 
reacted. Mark Galeotti explains the logic behind the “below-the-threshold” actions of 
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Russia as being “a regional power able to overwhelm small neighbors—as it did with 
Georgia in 2008—but not a global one.”71 Putin circumvented NATO’s capabilities, 
which are to deter and counter a mass attack from Russia, and played by a new rule book 
that emphasizes covert actions that circumvents NATO’s ability to react. 
D. EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGY 
The post-Stalin regimes faced many serious problems to solve in order to protect 
the balance of power with their adversaries. On the initiative of Khrushchev and the 
Politburo staff at the time, efforts to create a basis for grand strategy, policies, and 
decisions instigated discussions among the professional elite that ended up as the military 
doctrine. Contrary to Khrushchev’s idea of conventional disarmament in favor of 
strategic nuclear-missile technology, the military doctrine suggested constant readiness, 
military superiority both in quality and quantity, combined efforts of both new strategic 
and technological forces and conventional forces. The aim of this doctrine was to deter 
the West and avoid a world war, preempt an imminent attack with the first strike, and 
survive and assure victory in case deterrence and preemption fail and the war turns out to 
be protracted.72  
In the age of nuclear weapons, preparation for a nuclear war by achieving parity 
was acceptable; however, Khrushchev failed to sufficiently do so. According to 
Holloway, Brezhnev took over the Soviet Union in a strategically inferior position and 
made strenuous efforts to achieve strategic parity with the West.73 Afterward, to defuse 
tension, Brezhnev signaled that the aim of the Soviet Union was not superiority.74 While 
conducting SALT with the West to grant détente, Brezhnev changed the focal point of the 
military efforts to maintain limited national sovereignty and absolute Soviet control of the 
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socialist bloc.75 Until Brezhnev’s death, the main focus was to prevent a direct 
confrontation with the West, while consolidating power on its periphery. After Brezhnev 
died in 1982, doctrinal changes started to emerge, but the repercussions of the infamous 
Brezhnev Doctrine, which simply indicated that the Soviet Union would take precautions 
to maintain the Soviet bloc, lingered until late in the Gorbachev era. The “fraternal 
assistance” to nationalist movements, which started in the Khrushchev era, turned into 
military intervention to prevent revolutions, and succeeded.76 However, the new strategy 
failed to satisfy realpolitik. The mass Soviet military presence backfired and failed to 
prevent the widespread reactionary movements to replace communist regimes with 
socialist democracies. The new inertia did not help Gorbachev restore power and the 
gradual contraction in the Soviet presence in Europe ended with the collapse of the 
communist bloc.  
The post-Soviet Russian Federation created a balance of power with NATO after 
a stagnation during Yeltsin’s tenure. Russia has perpetuated the Soviet legacy of 
expanding Russian regional control and successfully prevented the West from meddling 
with its business. By using all its elements of national power in harmony, Putin’s Russia 
has tried to reinvigorate the communist bloc. With the transformation of the threat from 
nuclear weapons to terrorist networks, Russian countermeasures also evolved from 
necessary means to survive in nuclear warfare to all-inclusive combined covert efforts to 
succeed in hybrid warfare. 
E. THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN RUSSIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
The emphasis on multimillion-man armies in the Russian military discourse has 
recently shifted towards special operations, due to the changing threat perception and 
resources at hand. In theory, the strategic utility of special forces is mostly based on the 
strategy, task distribution, and capability of the units to achieve assigned tasks. Colin 
Gray argues that, “[t]he strategic value of special operations forces depends not just on 
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how well or poorly they perform, but also on how important for the war as a whole are 
their assigned missions.”77 That means, as a strategic instrument, the special forces need 
to succeed in their assigned missions and what they are asked to do should support an 
overall strategy to win. That said, the overall strategy remains most important and the 
various missions SOF would execute to support that strategy remains crucial. 
The Soviets first sensed the need for special operations to prevent possible 
escalation of global conflicts while pursuing their goals. Khrushchev intended to maintain 
Soviet military support to “national liberation movements,” but to refrain from an 
escalation into a war between states.78 He also aimed to prevent further nuclear 
proliferation.79 As Sokolovskii suggests in Soviet Military Strategy, 
By drawing this distinction, Khrushchev seemed to be saying that local 
war situations involving formal confrontation of Soviet and U.S. forces 
were dangerous and should be avoided, whereas national liberation 
struggles including guerrilla and proxy forces might be supported without 
undue risk.80  
The strategic path that would lead to political and military victory during the nuclear age 
entailed unconventional warfare that would avoid engagement in a mutually destructive 
nuclear confrontation. The Soviets, being aware of the power of covert actions, regarded 
anti-Soviet movements in the Soviet bloc as the work of foreign agents. In that respect, 
they used the argument of foreign involvement to justify their interference in their 
neighbors’ sovereignty. As Ouimet argues,  
Convinced that the Prague Spring had been the work of foreign agents, 
Moscow undertook its own covert operation to subvert and destroy it…. 
Reliance on tanks and troops gave way to the use of “special forces” and 
the strategic application of ultimatums. All necessary means, legal or 
illegal, were employed to compromise the authority of the reformist 
government while strengthening its conservative opponents.81  
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Later in Afghanistan, the Soviets employed the Spetsnaz to successfully capture a critical 
target, namely the presidential palace, in the aftermath of the mass forces’ arrival as 
“fraternal assistance.”82 The employment of the special forces, with the lack of a strategic 
scheme, did not result in achieving strategic outcomes in the long run. 
In order to balance the expansion of capitalism by influencing foreign 
governments, the Soviets employed special operators as military advisors all around the 
world. Rather than direct confrontations with the West, they tasked the Spetsnaz to serve 
as advisors in many countries to propagate communist ideas as a shield against Western 
imperialism. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the situation did not justify a 
Soviet invasion employing regular forces, as Holloway writes, “arms transfers and 
military advisers [were] used as major instruments of policy.”83 This concept of 
operations, similar to foreign internal defense or train and equip programs, points out 
another use of Spetsnaz and the utility of the special operations in Russian statecraft.  
The use of special operations to achieve strategic outcomes under Putin developed 
in a similar way with the operations in Czechoslovakia. First, Gerasimov and Putin put 
the blame on foreign agents for setting the stage for so-called “colored revolutions” and 
Arab spring, with the aim of changing the regime.84 Then, they used the same methods in 
Crimea using SOF. Without causing any reaction by the West, the near-bloodless 
annexation of Crimea represents one of the most significant military successes and 
strategic gains in recent history. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Soviets and then the Russians increasingly employed the Spetsnaz and other 
SOF-capable units to wage unconventional wars off the Western radar. Especially during 
the Soviet era, the Spetsnaz left indiscernible footprints by conducting low-profile, covert 
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actions. Also, they created a balance of power asymmetrically. Strategy and its practical 
implications in both the Soviet Union and the successive Russian Federation look 
identical. The Russians idiosyncratically justify their aggression by projecting a 
perceived interference by the West in their interest areas. Afterward, they use that 
perceived threat as a basis to counteract and subvert the unwanted outcomes in Russia’s 
favor. To achieve national objectives, the Russians increasingly rely on special 
operations. Thus, covert operations give the Russians increased space where they can 
politically maneuver. 
The nuclear threat during the Cold War compelled the Soviet Union to have 
deniability as an important factor to maintain a balance. The military doctrine during 
Khrushchev’s tenure required the Soviets to avoid mutual nuclear destruction. In that 
respect, Khrushchev tried to implement conventional disarmament in favor of strategic 
nuclear missiles. He aimed to achieve strategic superiority over the U.S. by doing so. He 
failed, and the Soviet Union began to decline. Still, Brezhnev managed the crisis 
skillfully and declared that the aim of the Soviet Union was to accomplish strategic parity 
rather than superiority.  
However, Brezhnev did not relinquish Khrushchev’s policy of keeping control 
over the Soviet bloc, and the operations he led in Czechoslovakia brought about the 
infamous Brezhnev Doctrine. The Brezhnev Doctrine simply stated that the Soviets 
would maintain Party control over the Soviet bloc by any means. Accordingly, the 
Soviets employed the Spetsnaz to facilitate control within the Soviet bloc and not 
provoke the West. During the Gorbachev era, the strategic parity evolved to a “new 
thinking” in strategic aims, which promoted openness and restructuring. Gorbachev’s 
policy changes helped end the Cold War. However, they also contributed to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Russian Federation.  
The immediate perceived threat for the Russian Federation became further 
territorial losses. In order to prevent that, Yeltsin started the first Chechen War. He aimed 
to restore central control over the separatist regions and gain a reputation by doing so. To 
his surprise, he lost the First Chechen War and was replaced by Putin. Putin aimed to end 
territorial losses. Moreover, he annexed Crimea in a near bloodless operation. Putin’s 
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new direction ameliorated the power projection of Russia. General Gerasimov articulated 
a new model, mostly known as the Gerasimov Doctrine or Model, which adds scientific 
prediction to power projection. In that model, Gerasimov emphasizes the use of special 
operations in the fluid nature of current and future conflicts, where there remains no 
boundary between peace and war. 
The strategic utility of the Spetsnaz has been consistent in Soviet and Russian 
Federation statecraft. In Hungary, GRU Spetsnaz captured the leaders and stopped the 
anti-Soviet rebellion.85 In Czechoslovakia, they facilitated the entry of the Soviet Army 
into the country and captured key government buildings as well as government 
officials.86 In Afghanistan, other than accomplishing similar objectives as in 
Czechoslovakia, the Spetsnaz introduced new tactics—specifically the use of helicopters 
to infiltrate, to evacuate, and to provide fire support—for Soviet operations.87 The 
Spetsnaz acquired more resources as they gained the trust of Soviet leaders. Even in 
1987, as Galeotti claims, “a Spetsnaz unit received its own dedicated air element,” for the 
first time.88 As the Spetsnaz garnered more resources, the leaders expected more from 
them. As Dziak writes, “once the Soviet military began to manifest a newfound ability to 
project beyond the Soviet heartland, GRU [Spetsnaz] forces began surfacing.”89 Since the 
Spetsnaz provided an expansion of choice and economy of force, master claims of Gray, 
they became an indispensable element in Soviet statecraft over time. 
Another reason why Russia emphasizes the use of special operations is due to the 
economic downturn. As Holloway suggests, “[t]he Soviet Union,” and now Russia, 
“conducts its relationship with the West from a position of military strength but economic 
weakness.”90 Therefore, Russian leaders, insofar as the context of the above conditions 
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remain, may increasingly resort to special operations to obtain strategic results in the 
pursuit of their national interests. 
Overall, as the spectrum of threats became more intricate, and the resources at 
hand lessened, special operations came into focus in Russian military discourse. While 
Khrushchev’s doctrine and the Brezhnev Doctrine did not address directly the use of 
special operations, the Gerasimov doctrine did. Gerasimov directly addresses the 
importance of employing special operations forces and countering the enemy’s. The 
specific focus on special operations forces proves the strategic importance of the special 
operations in current Russian statecraft.  
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III. CASE STUDY: OPERATION “DANUBE” IN 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
A. SITUATION 
In 1968, Czechoslovakia underwent a political transformation when reformist 
Alexander Dubcek became the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 
replacing pro-Soviet conservative Antonin Novotny.91 Dubcek would execute a program 
that he famously called “socialism with a human face.” However, the Soviet leaders 
worried that the reform movement would eventually break the country’s allegiance to 
Moscow. They regarded the transformation in Czechoslovakia as a loss of Party control 
and negotiated with Prague to maintain control over the country, but to no avail.92 Jiri 
Valenta, an American professor of Czech origin, writes that “on August 3, 1968, 
Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev and other members of the Soviet delegation to the 
Bratislava Conference, together with the leaders of several East European countries—
East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria—appeared to reach a modus vivendi with 
Alexander Dubcek’s leadership.”93 Before the Bratislava Conference, the Soviets 
unsuccessfully exerted several political and psychological measures, from direct talks to 
large scale military exercises, to decelerate the Prague Spring.94 They ran out of options 
as Dubcek did not slow down the momentum of the reforms and sought grounds for a 
military intervention.   
The Soviets still had influence on the inner circles of the Czechoslovak 
administration, which gave them the advantage of preempting the Czechoslovak defense. 
Furthermore, Dubcek wrote in 1990 that “the Czechoslovak antireformist [sic] coalition” 
invited the Soviet Army by providing the Soviet Embassy with falsified information.95 
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During Dubcek’s tenure, the Soviets put on extra overt and covert efforts to subvert the 
reform movement.96 They conducted large-scale and long-duration military exercises 
inside Czechoslovakia and western parts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR).97 As a result of a visit by General A. Epishev, the head of the Main Political 
Administration of the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovaks closed their Politico-Military 
Academy, which was one of the main supporters of the reforms.98 In a last attempt to 
deplete resources before the invasion, the Soviets dictated a transfer of Czechoslovak 
resources in support of an exercise held in East Germany.99 
On the other hand, the Soviet Union sought an acquiescent attitude from its Cold 
War opponent, the U.S., before the invasion. President Lyndon B. Johnson left 
Washington, DC, in August to return in September.100 The Kremlin regarded his distance 
from the capital on the brink of the aggressions as an implicit approval of the 
operation.101 Since no diplomatic solution and no external objection appeared, the 
Soviets decided to invade Czechoslovakia with support from four other Warsaw Pact 
countries—East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland. East Germany also played an 
important role by sapping Czechoslovakia of resources that could have helped the 
reformers in the country.102 Albania, Yugoslavia, and Warsaw Pact’s Romania 
diplomatically supported Czechoslovakia.103 On August 20, more than 500,000 Warsaw 
Pact troops crossed the Czechoslovak borders, led by Army Gen. Ivan G. Pavlovskii.104 
Simultaneously, the KGB and GRU Spetsnaz captured the Ruzyne airport near Prague to 
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establish an airhead and facilitate the entry of the invasion forces into the capital.105 The 
invasion officially started.  
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The main purpose of the operation was to replace the current leader of 
Czechoslovakia with a pro-Soviet one. The Soviet leaders failed in the negotiations to 
implement their desire to end the Prague Spring and decided on military intervention to 
thwart Dubcek’s reform movement.  They mainly aimed to coerce by military presence. 
In an ultimatum, they asked Dubcek either to revoke the reforms and conform to Soviet 
socialism or face a coup. Dubcek refused to decelerate the reforms.106 
Soviet political leaders also may have wanted to keep the Eastern bloc from 
dissolving. The risk that the reform movement in Czechoslovakia could extend to the rest 
of the Eastern bloc countries worried them.107 The military intervention in that sense 
would show Soviet leaders’ determination to keep the Warsaw Pact united while 
“liberating” Czechoslovakia. 
Soviet military leaders focused on invading the capital, Prague, as the main 
objective for a quick victory. To prevent heavy losses, they emphasized paralyzing the 
enemy’s vital center by massive surprise attacks.108 John H. Meritt, who spent over 
fifteen years in U.S. Special Forces, claims that “the Czechoslovaks offered no organized 
military resistance to invaders.”109 He writes the reasons to his claim as “extensive Soviet 
preparation beforehand, and the surprise, magnitude, and swiftness of the invasion.”110 
Dubcek suggests otherwise stating that the Soviet Army should not get credit because a 
military conflict did not happen, and probably wants the credit for his own prudence.111  
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The Spetsnaz’s experience in Hungary gave the Soviet leaders reasons to employ 
them in Czechoslovakia in broader terms.112 The leaders ordered the Spetsnaz to secure 
the Ruzyne airport, to lead the way through Prague, and like Hungary, to capture the 
opponent’s political leaders and bring them to Moscow.113 Meanwhile, other Warsaw 
Pact countries would penetrate the country from several directions to create a diversion 
and to prevent a possible counterattack from Prague. Nearly five days after the operation 
began, Dubcek and the Soviets settled the situation in the Soviet Union’s favor in the 
Kremlin, when possibly Spetsnaz operatives escorted him and his cabinet into Moscow to 
attend meetings.114 The Prague Spring officially ended. 
C. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION 
The first element of Spetsnaz secured an airhead and then the rest of the Spetsnaz, 
airborne troops, and armed forces contingents arrived at the Ruzyne airport to occupy 
Prague.115 At that time, the GRU operated under the KGB, especially in operations 
abroad where the political situation looked sensitive.116 Before the war, the KGB and the 
GRU had already established pro-Soviet networks inside Czechoslovakia.117 Those 
networks, the communist hard-liners, and Soviet operatives inside Czechoslovakia 
facilitated the invasion. As Ross S. Kelly claims, “Spetsnaz elements infiltrated into 
Czechoslovakia just prior to the May [sic] 1968 invasion and facilitated the occupation of 
Prague airport by the 103rd Guards Airborne Division.”118  
The invasion essentially followed the ultimatum that threatened Dubcek to 
conform to the Soviet requests, otherwise he would be removed by either an internal or 
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an external coup.119 The Kremlin used a reverse psychology on Czechoslovak leaders 
and the Soviet public using the press to cover for its illicit plan. Pravda, a Soviet 
propaganda disseminator, headlined fabricated evidence that implicated the U.S. in a 
coup attempt in Czechoslovakia.120 With that, the Soviet leaders probably aimed to 
justify the Soviet Army’s prospective invasion of the country. Professor Valenta claims 
that the KGB and their agents in Czechoslovakia were most likely involved in placing the 
U.S. origin weapons as evidence of a U.S.-based counter-revolutionary coup attempt.121 
In that sense, the operational concept was a surprise attack to invade the country 
with an army of nearly half-million men. The Soviets employed the Spetsnaz to shape the 
battlefield before the invasion and then to lead the way. By capturing the leaders without 
harming the city and ultimately replacing them with pro-Soviet stooges, the Soviets 
accomplished an external coup. 
D. ROLE OF SPETSNAZ 
In August 1968, the Soviet Union “temporarily” sent troops to “liberate” 
Czechoslovakia.122 By declaring the invasion as “temporarily to liberate,” the Soviet 
Union intended to keep the West from intervening, and also to ease fear among 
Czechoslovaks. This partly worked. The West did not intervene other than a weak 
condemnation from the United Nations (UN), but the Czechoslovak people protested the 
Soviet troops.123 
Thus, KGB Spetsnaz operatives landed at the Ruzyne airport near Prague in 
civilian clothes and contacted pro-Soviet security officers.124 With their help, the 
Aeroflot airplanes carried the GRU Spetsnaz soldiers first. Then the rest of the army 
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contingents landed. After the KGB and GRU Spetsnaz completely took control of the 
airport, GRU Spetsnaz, along with the mass army components, moved through the city 
center to capture key government buildings. Galeotti lists the buildings as “the 
presidential palace, the main bridges, the radio station, and Letna Hill—a commanding 
height on which the VDV would then emplace artillery.”125 Meritt adds that the Spetsnaz 
and SOF-capable airborne units also captured “other radio and television stations, railway 
stations, the post office, telephone central offices, central crossroads, and key leaders of 
the reform movement.”126 
On short notice, the surprise attack paralyzed the Czechoslovak security 
apparatus, and the city fell into Soviet hands. The Spetsnaz and SOF-capable airborne 
troops, after occupying key facilities, captured Dubcek and other reformist cabinet 
members. The day after the invasion began, they escorted the officials to the Ruzyne 
airport and onto Moscow in a military aircraft.127 
E. RESULTS 
The KGB and GRU Spetsnaz enabled a mass army to enter Czechoslovakia and 
captured the reformist leaders alive. Given the politically-sensitive environment and the 
importance of public opinion, the Spetsnaz contributed greatly to the overall campaign. It 
is difficult to differentiate and compare the relative quality of KGB Spetsnaz and GRU 
Spetsnaz. However, both Spetsnaz worked together to accomplish their missions. 
Galeotti suggests that the KGB’s chief Yuri V. Andropov’s interaction with the 
Spetsnaz played a vital role in employing them.128 In 1956, when Andropov was the 
Soviet ambassador to Budapest, he suggested the use of Spetsnaz to capture cabinet 
members to quell the Hungarian uprising. Later, as he recognized the utility of such 
forces, he created the KGB’s own Spetsnaz in 1967.129 His choice of GRU’s and KGB’s 
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Spetsnaz in Operation Danube shows his appreciation and confidence in SOF capability. 
It also indicates the reliability of the Spetsnaz and perhaps the agent networks they 
established before the invasion, as Suvorov mentions.130 In both cases, the success of the 
Spetsnaz in restoring pro-Soviet regimes and Andropov himself played key roles in, as 
Galeotti writes, “the evolution of the Spetsnaz from a military to politico-military 
force.”131 
Regarding Spetsnaz’s strategic utility, the operations conducted by KGB and 
GRU Spetsnaz and SOF-capable VDV troops fall under Gray’s: “tasks that only special 
operation forces can perform.”132 In the presence of a massive army, the Spetsnaz 
conducted surgical operations with relatively small numbers. Therefore, Soviet SOF units 
were able to demonstrate “control of escalation” and “shaping the future,” in addition to 
“economy of force” and “expansion of choice” master claims outlined by Gray.133 
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IV. CASE STUDY: THE CHECHEN WARS 
A. SITUATION 
1. Early History of the Conflict 
The first Russo-Chechen conflict dates back to July 1785,134 a year after Sheikh 
Mansur135 initiated a revolt against Russian rule.136 A Chechen Muslim imam and a Sufi 
scholar, Mansur gained fame among the Caucasian people and gathered several ethnic 
groups together to rise as one against those Muslims he considered corrupt. Subsequently, 
he transformed his campaign into one to obliterate non-Muslims, specifically Orthodox 
Christian Russia.137 Mansur’s efforts to convince Ottomans to aid his jihad rang alarm 
bells, and the Russians sent the Astrakhan Regiment to quell the uprising.138 The first 
battle at Sunzha River ended in Russian defeat, leaving 600 dead and 100 captured.139 
This phenomenal victory helped spread the word about Mansur’s reputation in defeating 
the Russians, and Mansur gathered 12,000 men from across the North Caucasus to fight 
in successive campaigns.140 Mark Galeotti describes Mansur as “a charismatic leader 
rather than strategist,” who, overconfidently, “made the mistake of crossing into Russian 
territory and trying to take the fortress of Kizlyar.”141 Mansur’s poor judgement in the 
war zone resulted in his forces’ defeat and hindered his anti-Russian campaign. He 
remained active until his capture in 1791, but without another significant victory.142 
However, his struggle proved that Chechens would be a thorn in Russian security. 
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After years of battles in the Caucasus, Imam Shamil emerged as the second 
phenomenal leader whose fame would exceed Sheikh Mansur’s. In an attempt to secure 
the routes to Georgia and to provide safety during the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian 
conflicts, Russia assigned General Alexei Yermolov the task of extending its rule in the 
North Caucasus.143 His attempt to push the Chechens into the mountains backfired as 
Imam Shamil, a Dagestani mountaineer himself, became, as Galeotti writes, “the de facto 
moral leader of the scattered ‘mountaineer’ resistance movement.”144 The Russians 
rejected Imam Shamil’s attempts at a parley, since they regarded an armistice as a 
Russian concession.145 Numerous Russian victories over Shamil’s men misled the 
Russians to believe that the Chechen will to resist was easy to break. However, until the 
end of Crimean War in 1856, Shamil and his men were able to sustain the fight using 
guerrilla tactics. Russia was able to deploy the bulk of its forces to Chechnya when the 
Crimean War ended. In 1859, Shamil was detained, and Chechnya formally became part 
of Russia again.146 As William J. Nemeth writes, “Shamil left a legacy of stubborn 
resistance, extreme tenacity, and the ability to recover from apparently crushing defeats, 
which can be seen in today’s rebellion.”147 Although the Chechens lost numerous battles, 
their will to fight survived each and every battle, thanks to Shamil. 
The collapse of the Russian Empire and the subsequent emergence of the Soviet 
Socialist Republic gave Chechens hope for independence, but the bubble burst quickly. 
As Galeotti describes it, “nationality policy and the Caucasus campaign lay in the hands 
of an ambitious and uncompromising Bolshevik by the name of Joseph Stalin.”148 In 
addition, he suggests, “[Stalin] was not inclined to dismantle Russia’s empire[,] and in 
1921, the Mountaineer Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Gorsky ASSR) was 
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established, subordinated to Moscow.”149 Galeotti’s suggestion implies that Stalin 
repressed Chechen ambition for independence and subjugated the Chechen people. His 
harsh treatment brought about another rebellion that only lasted for a year.150 Stalin never 
allowed Chechens free rein, and he managed to quash every secessionist movement. In 
1937, after seven years of a Red Army crackdown on the region, Stalin ordered the 
execution of 14,000 Chechen and Ingush.151 In 1944, to secure the southern front while 
fighting against Nazi Germany, Stalin expelled nearly 480,000 Chechens to Central Asia, 
with the approval of the Politburo,152 leaving nearly 200,000 dead bodies, in an operation 
called Lentil.153 Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal suggest that “17,698 ‘special 
operatives’ and 83,003 ordinary soldiers” executed the expulsion.154 Instead of fading 
away in exile, the Chechen will to resist flourished as they transformed into a nation. Gall 
and de Waal write about Chechens’ new identity as “[t]hirteen years of exile arguably 
gave the Chechens a sense of common national identity as Chechens—as distinct from 
belonging to a certain teip or village—for the first time.”155 Three years after Stalin’s 
death, in April 1956, Khrushchev allowed all exiles to return to their homelands.156 The 
battle-hardened, tight-knit, and revengeful Chechens returned to what remained of their 
homes. 
As the deportees arrived, a new debate between the returning old inhabitants and 
the new owners of the lands and properties brought about tension. Along with domestic 
problems, the incumbents’ failure to address the underlying issues that caused the Russo-
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Chechen conflict led to a new broad unrest in February 1973, but to no avail.157 
Henceforth, low-intensity conflict conditions lingered for decades. The hardship the 
Chechens faced during the exile in the mid 20th century molded the Chechen youth and 
steered them towards leading and fighting in the First and Second Chechen Wars. 
2. After the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
In the 1980s, thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberal reforms, the Chechens started 
to seek freedom in a nationalist campaign led by Dzhokhar Dudayev.158 With the 
opportunity that the Soviet Union’s collapse created, Dudayev declared independence 
after winning the October 1991 presidential election held in Chechnya.159 Boris Yeltsin, 
then the president of the Russian republic, declared the election null and ordered a 
battalion of interior troops (MVD VV) to arrest Dudayev and quell the uprising.160 In 
contrast to Yeltsin’s intentions, unsuccessful Russian attempts to keep the Chechens 
under Russian control made the Chechens entrench in their national cause. Both Russians 
and Chechens underestimated each other’s will to shed blood to achieve their respective 
purposes: the Russians trying to rule the Chechens, and the Chechens trying to gain 
independence. In June 1992, Russia again refused to accept the self-declared Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria as an independent state after the split of Ingushetia and 
Chechnya.161 
Russia embarked on an operation in December 1994 under the above-mentioned 
circumstances in a bid to deny independence to Chechens. The First Chechen War lasted 
two years and ended in the fall of 1996 with a subsequent peace settlement in November. 
The Russian defeat in the war caused a dramatic decrease in popular support for Yeltsin. 
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Along with the public’s divided views on military involvement in Chechnya, Yeltsin’s 
lack of mastery in handling the war dramatically decreased his reputation at home and 
abroad.162 His successful reelection in 1996 did not restore his prewar popularity. 
Increasing tensions and his inability to deal with the situation contributed to Vladimir 
Putin’s rise to power. In August 1999, Putin was assigned as prime minister (though 
Yeltsin’s bad health may have also been a factor). In December, a month after Russian 
forces marched into Chechnya for the second time, Putin replaced Yeltsin as the Russian 
President. 
The bombings in Dagestan and Moscow allegedly started the second war. These 
terrorist actions were allegedly conducted by Habib Abdurrahman Khattab’s group 
(Saudi Muslim-radical-mercenaries), Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev and his followers, 
and Dagestani Islamist Radicals.163 The same tripartite alliance resulted in a large-scale 
incursion into Dagestan to liberate it from Russia and join with Chechnya in a single 
Islamic State.164 In order to end the terrorist activities and secessionist movements, 
Russian forces again moved into Chechnya in October 1999. After ten years of 
devastating terrorist actions, catastrophic hostage rescue operations, and political turmoil, 
the Kremlin officially ended the war in April 2009, declaring the counterterrorism 
operation in Chechnya over.165 Nevertheless, endless turmoil in the North Caucasus 
continues to contribute to global jihadist terrorism by exporting fighters to conflict zones 
all around the globe.166 
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To recap, the two wars fought in Chechen lands strongly shaped Russian politics. 
The wars helped discredit Yeltsin and helped empower Putin.167 At the time, Lieven 
wrote that “the [war] in Chechnya has the potential to cause instability in the surrounding 
region through terrorism, refugees, and Russian pressure on neighboring countries to 
deny rebels ‘safe havens.’”168 Despite the fact that the prolonged nature of the second 
war paved the way for the subsequent unrest not only in Chechnya, but also in the 
contiguous states, Putin managed to increase his popularity at home and abroad. He later 
successfully isolated Chechen’s fight from international support and inserted a Russian 
proxy, Akhmad Kadyrov, into Chechnya to rule the region in accordance with Russian 
interests.  
After Akhmad Kadyrov’s death by suicide bomber in May 2004, his son, Ramzan 
Kadyrov, was appointed prime minister and then Chechen president in March 2006 and 
in March 2007, respectively.169 Since then, Ramzan Kadyrov has ruled Chechnya with 
allegiance to Putin. 
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
1. The First Chechen War 
Yeltsin struggled to prevent the Russian Federation from dissolving despite his 
pre-election rhetoric to grant the constituent states freedom in deciding their destinies. 
Yeltsin did not tolerate secessionist movements in Chechnya or anywhere else in that 
region. Also, in Galeotti’s words, “Yeltsin needed to prove that no one could challenge 
Moscow with impunity.”170  
Therefore, the primary purposes of the first war were: to set a precedent for latent 
secessionist movements across the federation and preserve the Federation, to create a 
distraction from a failing economy, and to accomplish these objectives using indigenous 
                                                 
167 Bowker, “Conflict in Chechnya,” 255. 
168 Lieven, “What Is the Future of Chechnya,” 244. 
169 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya, 1994–2009, 11. 
170 Ibid., 31. 
 45
forces rather than federal forces. Yeltsin was counting on Dudayev’s opponents and 
Russian “volunteers” and supported them in the unsuccessful October-November 1994 
coup.171 The poorly planned coup attempt turned into a disaster for the Russians.172 
Subsequently, a state of emergency in Chechnya to restore order and federal involvement 
followed.  
Since the coup attempt by Russian-backed Provisional Chechen Council Forces 
failed, Yeltsin ordered the military to capture Grozny, misguidedly believing that the fall 
of Grozny would mean victory. The primary purposes did not change. However, since the 
indigenous forces did not contribute to the campaign, their workload shifted to the federal 
forces. Minister of Defense General Pavel Grachev personally briefed the objectives to 
capture Grozny.173 In her 2001 RAND report, Olga Oliker cites several resources and 
puts the three-stage plan in the following paragraph: 
Stage I would begin on November 29, 1994 and be over by December 6 
(eight days). Over the course of this week, forces would prepare and 
secure locations from which operations would later be conducted while 
forward aviation and attack helicopters attained air superiority and other 
units prepared for electronic warfare. Three days, December 7–9, were 
allocated for Stage II, during which Russian troops would approach 
Grozny from five directions and effect a double encirclement—of the city 
and of the republic as a whole—all the while protecting communications 
and carrying out reconnaissance. The next four days, December 10–14 
would comprise Stage III: the actual assault on Grozny. Forces would 
move from the north and south of the city to capture the Presidential 
Palace and other key government buildings, television and radio facilities, 
and other significant sites.174 
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This direct push to Grozny met with several obstacles before it even began. 
Mobilization of the troops lasted longer than expected, and task forces were not able to 
move until December 11.175 The Russians, it turned out, were destined to fail. The 
inadequate prewar reconnaissance and false assumption that the Chechens would 
welcome Russians with open arms led the Russian leaders into a limited show of force. 
Referring to Yeltsin, Bowker says “his defense minister had told him that Russian forces 
could take Grozny with just two paratroop regiments in two hours.”176 Apparently, 
Russians did not know what to expect before they entered the war zone. 
The preparations and plans were shortsighted and insufficient to accomplish the 
purpose of the First Chechen War. Grozny remained Russian for only two years, causing 
devastating military casualties and civilian losses on both sides.177 Yeltsin could not get 
what he yearned for and lost a considerable amount of domestic popular support. 
Yeltsin’s erroneous conclusion that the war was won based on decreasing Chechen 
attacks gave Russians confidence and prematurely caused reductions in military presence 
in Grozny. In August 1996, Chechen rebels led by Aslan Maskhadov took Grozny back 
in “a daring counter-strike.”178 Nemeth states that “the Chechen forces were again 
operating in a quasi-conventional manner, which culminated in the attack and defeat of 
the Russians in Grozny during August 1996.”179 That did not end sporadic brawls and 
clashes. Seemingly endless violence eventually brought the two sides to the table. 
Alexander Lebed, Russian security council secretary, and Maskhadov concluded the 
Khasav-Yurt armistice on August 30, 1996.180 In November, a peace settlement was 
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agreed upon which simply stated that Russia would not attack Chechnya, insofar as 
Chechnya would not declare independence.181 
2. The Second Chechen War 
Increasing tension across the Caucasus mountains and Maskhadov’s inability to 
prevent rebel warlords, namely Basayev and Khattab, from conducting terrorist actions 
put Russia and Chechnya on the brink of war again. The invasion of Dagestan by these 
two warlords and Dagestani secessionists ultimately started the war. In the Second 
Chechen War, Putin intended to end terrorist and secessionist activities to show his 
determination and power to the Russian public, to reinvigorate central control, and to 
prove to the world that Russia was a great power once again.182 
Putin’s main objective was capturing Grozny again. For that purpose, Putin 
ordered the third bloody battle for the city. Compared to the earlier battles, Galeotti refers 
to the Russian plans for the third battle of Grozny as “a staged and methodical one.”183 
The plan was to seal Chechnya’s borders, to narrow the security cordon until the assigned 
units set up positions as much as three miles inside Chechnya, to occupy the northern 
third of Chechnya by advancing to the Terek river, and when forces are concentrated and 
their rear is secured, to attack Grozny from three fronts—north, east, and west.184  
This time the Russians knew that the Chechens would resist and anticipated that 
they also would be better prepared. The Chechens entrenched their defenses inside 
Grozny, digging tunnels and booby-trapping in the buildings they could not hold. The 
Russians were better organized and improved their armored vehicles and use of 
technology. This time they relied on artillery and air power but also had detailed 
contingency plans. The extra level of awareness in the Russian troops, along with 
destroyed urban centers, booby-traps set by rebels, and snipers, made the Russians move 
                                                 
181 Galeotti, Russia’s Wars in Chechnya, 1994–2009, 48. 
182 Ibid., 53–54. 
183 Ibid., 55. 
184 Ibid., 55–56. 
 48
more cautiously, which increased their vulnerability.185 About five months after the 
declaration of Maskhadov’s illegitimacy and the reassertion of Russian authority by Putin 
on October 1, 1999,186 the Second Chechen War moved into a new phase when Grozny 
became Russian for the second time. Putin’s determination to pacify Chechnya brought 
about disastrous Russian counterterrorist measures as Chechens resorted to terrorism.  
In 2002, operational responsibility in Chechnya passed from the military to 
interior forces, and the concept of operations switched to counterterrorism. As the first 
signal of the transformation, the new commander of the “Special Joint Grouping of 
Forces (OGV)” came from the MVD, even though his predecessors were from the 
Army.187 The military and GRU’s Spetsnaz gradually left Chechnya. Consecutive 
terrorist attacks and counterterrorist operations devastated the region until 2009. 
Although the fighting was far from over, the Kremlin officially declared the war over in 
April 2009.188 
C. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION 
In both wars, counterinsurgency constituted the overall operational concept. Since 
the attacks mostly occurred in the cities, the military operations were conducted in urban 
terrain. After Russia announced direct rule over Chechnya, MVD and pro-Russian 
Chechen militias took over operations against Chechen rebels and the operational concept 
switched to counterterrorism. 
In the first war, both operational concepts lacked proper doctrine, dedicated units, 
and relevant training. Russians learned on the fly during fierce and bloody clashes.189 
The Spetsnaz, in parallel with the general lack of mastery in the overall campaign, were 
not employed effectively in the first phases of the war. Later on, when the Russians met 
heavy resistance, the better-trained Spetsnaz with better equipment rose as an alternative 
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choice to employ in urban areas. Mostly employed in reconnaissance, coordinating 
artillery and air support, sniper and counter-sniper missions, and also engaging in close 
quarter battle in the urban areas, the Spetsnaz proved a brilliant element in the fight 
against the rebels. 
Having learned from their mistakes in the first war, the Russians used the 
Spetsnaz more effectively in the second one, starting in the early stages of the war with 
reconnaissance missions and conscripting, training, and equipping indigenous defectors. 
The Spetsnaz also conducted the same missions that they did in the first war, but this time 
more systematically under a unified command, adding more to the already better 
organized campaign. After Grozny was captured, the Spetsnaz kept going after escaping 
rebels in a bid to crush the Chechen cause for good. Since the rebels were dispersed 
throughout the surrounding villages, their recognition and elimination would require 
surgical kill or capture operations. However, the tasks that the Spetsnaz accomplished in 
those operations are unknown. 
Cleansing the North Caucasus mountains of Chechen rebels turned into a disaster 
by causing significant civilian casualties. In one particular raid, while trying to kill the 
infamous warlord Ruslan Gelayev of Komsomolskoye village, the Russians killed 552 
Chechen civilians and lost fifty soldiers.190 This tragedy undermined the Russian cause. 
Furthermore, MVD’s Alpha counterterrorist team and OMON special police forces 
stormed the Dubrovka theater in 2002 and the Beslan school in 2004.191 The death toll in 
Dubrovka included 179 hostages and the death toll in Beslan included 334 hostages, of 
which 186 were children.192  
Moscow announced direct rule over Chechnya in May 2000 and Putin appointed 
Akhmad Kadyrov in June.193 Then, the war evolved into an internal affair. Federal police 
forces and Spetsnaz-trained Kadyrovtsy—indigenous pro-Russian militias—took over 
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conducting counterterrorism operations in the following years until the end of the 
counterterrorism war in 2009.  
D. ROLE OF SPETSNAZ 
1. The First Chechen War 
In the first war, as mentioned above, Yeltsin first supported Dudayev’s opponents 
in a failed coup attempt. Then, the federal forces’ involvement became inevitable in order 
to deny Chechnya independence. The number of troops involved is unclear.194 However, 
the manner in which the operation was executed is clear. In short, first the Russian air 
force provided air superiority, and then the Russian ground forces moved into Grozny to 
face their enemy. Contrary to the plans, the Russians never managed to seal Grozny, 
especially in the south.195 That gave the rebels an escape route and a chance to regroup 
and prepare for a counterattack. The Chechens took Grozny back in August 1996. In 
between capturing Grozny and losing it, the Russians engaged the rebels in numerous 
bloody urban raids.  
During the campaign, Spetsnaz units were employed in various ways. Especially 
after the Russians experienced the impasse in Grozny, most of the reinforcements came 
from operational units, including Spetsnaz units from across the country.196 In the first 
stages, the Spetsnaz units executed their traditional battlefield reconnaissance 
missions.197 However, the lack of intelligence caused Russians to underestimate their 
enemy.198 Therefore, one can assume that either the Spetsnaz executed their missions 
after the conventional forces started to move on December 11, 1994, or they failed in 
their early reconnaissance missions. As soon as the Russians captured key points in 
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Chechnya, the Spetsnaz were used as “shock troops” and conducted missions mentioned 
in the previous section.199 Despite their superior skills of operating in urban areas, the 
Spetsnaz suffered heavy losses. These losses partly resulted from the considerable 
number of Soviet-era Spetsnaz veterans among the Chechen rebels.200 The Chechens 
knew how the Spetsnaz would operate. Additionally, the rebels had all the advantages of 
being the resident insurgent force. Galeotti gives an example of the relative weakness of 
the Spetsnaz: “one whole platoon from Moscow [was] wiped out when they were lured 
into a building that had been booby-trapped with explosives.”201 Furthermore, the 
disproportionate strength of the sides made the Chechens resort to terrorist attacks, thus 
adding more to the death toll. In 1995, the Chechens conducted a treacherous act when 
Basayev was surrounded in a hospital in Budyonnovsk.202 The Russians, trying to 
recapture the hospital and rescue the hostages, killed about 150 civilians and let Basayev 
make his way back to Chechnya.203 Oliker suggests that the Spetsnaz took part in the 
rescue operation in support of MVD’s elite Alpha counterterrorist forces.204 Their 
mission was simply to create a diversion when the actual assault team, the Alpha, 
approached the building.205 The overall rescue mission failed and nearly all of Basayev’s 
demands were met. 
The costly nature of the urban warfare decreased the morale of the Spetsnaz 
soldiers and made the commanders withdraw most of the Spetsnaz units by mid-1995.206 
The remaining Spetsnaz units were employed in “ambushing rebel forces, launching raids 
against high-value targets identified by human or technical intelligence, and interdicting 
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supply lines.”207 When the Chechens retook Grozny, the Russians made an interim peace 
agreement and terminated all military operations. This interim peace agreement would 
last until the launch of the second war in 1999.208 
2. The Second Chechen War 
The Spetsnaz, along with the rest of the army, were better prepared for the second 
war. Russians learned from their mistakes in the first war and improved their tactics to 
defeat their enemy. Like the first war, the second one also started with a massive air 
campaign, and then the bulk of the army and interior troops moved through Grozny. This 
time, instead of making a direct and daring raid into Grozny, the Russians were very 
cautious and methodical.  
The Spetsnaz were successful during urban and rural raids and battlefield 
reconnaissance. Their level of training and preparation made them better at spotting for 
artillery and air support. Additional tasks for Spetsnaz included, as Galeotti writes, “deep 
reconnaissance, interdiction, intelligence-gathering, and rapid response.”209 As in 
Afghanistan, they conducted heliborne supply-convoy interceptions.210 The Spetsnaz and 
the Army’s special mountain troops operated together successfully in the mountainous 
terrain.211 The Spetsnaz also experienced tragic moments. When the Chechens heavily 
outnumbered the Spetsnaz and paratroopers in the Argun valley, the company 
commander erroneously called artillery fire onto his own position rather than on the 
Chechens, killing 84 Russian soldiers out of 91.212 Galeotti describes this action as a 
military defeat, yet “a perverse source of pride, akin to the Krer raids in 1986.”213 
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The most salient use of the Spetsnaz in the second war was to create indigenous 
special forces units in an effort to further Moscow’s “Chechenization” of the war.214 
Recruiting, training, and equipping efforts started before the war. When the Russian 
Spetsnaz left Chechnya, local forces known as Kadyrovtsy, Akhmad Kadyrov’s loyalists, 
replaced them. 215 Reporting to the GRU, these units sometimes called themselves 
Spetsnaz.216 
As mentioned in the concept of the operation section, the Second Chechen War 
was over in March 2002 and MVD troops together with indigenous forces took over anti-
terrorist operations which lasted until 2009. Galeotti suggests that, “[b]y around 2005[,] 
most military Spetsnaz had been withdrawn from Chechnya itself, even if similarly 
designated units responsible to the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD) remained.”217 Thus, GRU Spetsnaz’s missions in the Second 
Chechen War ended. 
E. RESULTS 
The Spetsnaz provided an expansion of choice for the Russian leaders. Since the 
Spetsnaz had better training and equipment, the Russian leaders chose to employ them in 
urban warfare. Their level of training and preparation were better in the first war than the 
rest of the fighting forces, but were not good enough to make up for the general military 
incompetence. However skillful they were, they did not have sufficient information about 
the Chechen rebels. The deep reconnaissance missions were not executed properly. 
In the second war, having learned from their mistakes, the Spetsnaz contributed 
significantly to the overall campaign. Also, the improved training and preparation of the 
rest of the army had a decisive impact in consolidating victory. As a consequence, 
Galeotti suggests, “the Chechen wars were crucial in the evolution of Russia’s military 
                                                 





special forces.”218 The lessons learned from the urban warfare may also contribute to 
NATO countries’ forces.219 
Regarding Spetsnaz’s strategic utility in the first war, most of the operations the 
Spetsnaz performed fall under Colin Gray’s, “tasks that special operations forces can do 
well,” category.220 However, since the rest of the forces could not do their tasks as 
required, the first war was lost. In the second war, the commitment, training, and 
preparation of all the forces improved. Along with the rest of the army, the Spetsnaz also 
learned from the first war. This time, their improved capabilities and more skillful 
employment resulted in greater strategic utility to win the war. Specifically, the creation 
of the indigenous forces, which may fall under, “tasks that only special operations forces 
can perform,”221 invaluably contributed to the overall strategy. This operation was 
exceptionally successful. In fact, the Kadyrovtsy still constitutes Chechnya’s armed 
forces under the rule of Ramzan Kadyrov. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, Gray groups, “economy of force” and the “expansion 
of choice,” as the “master claims;” in addition to “innovation,” “morale,” “showcasing of 
competence,” “reassurance,” “humiliation of the enemy,” “control of escalation,” and 
“shaping the future,” to the concept of strategic utility of special operations.222 To recap, 
in the Chechen wars, the Spetsnaz provided an “expansion of choice” simply because 
their superior ability to operate in urban terrain. In conclusion, after two wars, the 
Spetsnaz met most of the claims outlined by Colin Gray. 
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V. CASE STUDY: THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA 
A. SITUATION 
In 1783, after 300 years of Ottoman rule, the Crimea was annexed by Russian 
Empress Catherine II.223 Following that victory, Crimea experienced a variety of political 
relationships with Russia, ranging from near-autonomy to becoming a subservient oblast 
(province).224 An alliance of France, the United Kingdom, the Ottoman Empire, and later 
Sardinia won the Crimean War in 1856, but the victory ultimately did not suffice to break 
the region away from Russian control.225 Crimea remained a Russian territory for another 
century after the battle that had instigated “the destruction of the European order.”226 In 
1954, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev handed control of Crimea over to the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, but in practical terms the region was under 
Moscow’s control as long as the Soviet Union existed.227 Despite the ebb and flow in the 
post-Soviet era, Russia, in agreement with Ukraine, had political control over Crimea 
until 2014.228 However, in 2014, when Russian influence in Ukraine became 
questionable, Russia exerted direct rule over the peninsula. 
The Crimean port city of Sevastopol harbors the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), 
which is the primary reason why the territory is of utmost strategic importance for 
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Moscow and vital to Russian national security and national interests. In the two decades 
since its emergence, the Russian Federation has revitalized its power, and through the 
constant application of synchronized political warfare, created the circumstances essential 
for an operation to take back Crimea.229 Once Russian President Vladimir Putin had 
offered to “guarantee Crimea’s territory” in 2006, the only remaining requirement to 
legitimize an invasion became finding the right window of opportunity.230 
With full knowledge of external vulnerabilities—in particular, NATO’s 
ponderous decision-making process and low-probability of reaction to events in 
Ukraine—Russia had the window of opportunity to fulfill its long-term dream. On March 
21, 2014,231 the Russian Federation annexed Crimea following “armed intervention by 
forces of the Russian Federation, a referendum, and a declaration of independence in 
Crimea.”232 This second annexation of Crimea demonstrated a way to achieve victory 
short of an actual military fight and showed to the world Putin’s ability to accomplish 
Russia’s strategic goals. The Russian Spetsnaz played its role in the armed intervention 
portion of the annexation, which started on 20 February—according to the date on the 
Russian campaign medals.233 
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The Russians aimed to exert direct rule over Crimea in response to the 
westernization of the government in Kiev, and they depended mostly on the employment 
of SOF-capable units to invade the country. Consequently, Russia annexed Crimea for 
the second time in history, whether acknowledged by the rest of the world or not. The 
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contributions of other Russian intelligence organizations to the outcome remain 
unknown. However, there were sufficient human resources inside, or insiders, ready to 
act and facilitate the invasion when Russian units infiltrated. Unfortunately, the actual 
extent of the covert operations conducted will remain classified until the Russian archives 
are opened. Nevertheless, from what can be inferred, GRU’s Spetsnaz and the newly 
formed KSO played vital roles in the process.  
The use of ambiguous warfare,234 including self-defense groups, special units, 
and covert actions, may signal that Russia does not want a powerful actor—like NATO 
or the United States—to interfere. While preparing for the Crimean war by stealth, the 
Russians refrained from attracting the attention of the West, thus achieving a sense of 
surprise and giving Russia space to maneuver. Also, the employment of nearly all of 
Russian special units in Crimea contributed to that purpose. It may also indicate an 
evolution of the units from the Soviet Spetsnaz to a more modern SOF that is 
organizationally closer to its Western counterparts.  
Another purpose of employing nearly all SOF-capable units may be a test of the 
latest reforms within the Russian military. The Russian military reform, which Defense 
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov initiated after the conflict in Georgia in 2008, continued 
under his successor Sergei Shoigu, and later accelerated under Gen. Gerasimov, was 
revealed with the equipment of the special operators during the Crimean conflict.235 On 
the other hand, the Gerasimov Doctrine indicated the importance of special operations 
and SOF to achieve political ends a year prior to the operation. The operation in Crimea 
can be deemed as a display of the Gerasimov Doctrine.  
Another significant strategic outcome of the Crimean operation is the messages it 
communicated to Russia’s “targets of influence,”236 which include all opponents of the 
Russian Federation. First is Russia’s splendid proficiency in paralyzing Western decision 
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makers before they could react to prevent Moscow from accomplishing its strategic 
objectives. Second, Russia demonstrated both its will and the means to back up that will 
should the West encroach on the interests of the Russian Federation, the “rightful” 
successor of the Soviet Union. Put simply, the Russian Federation got what it wanted 
before its opponents could acknowledge what was happening. The reluctance or 
inadequacy of the West to react potentially gave Putin freedom to act and expanded room 
for maneuver to pursue Russia’s foreign policy objectives. 
C. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION 
The Russians accomplished a coup de main with the help of local militias, which 
allegedly comprised a mix of ex-soldiers and Spetsnaz-trained pro-Russian residents.237 
Different from the earlier Soviet and Russian campaigns, the annexation of Crimea was 
fulfilled mostly by the Spetsnaz and other SOF-capable units. In the early phases of the 
occupation, apart from the logistical support provided by Russian units inside Crimea and 
the carrier planes, the operation did not include conventional units. Later deployment of 
conventional units to Crimea aimed to consolidate the Russian dominance, in case 
Ukrainian soldiers reacted. 
In order to combine efforts of the local people and Russian soldiers, the Russians 
established networks within the society with the help of the BSF and other units that were 
already based in Crimea.238 Those networks swiftly blockaded key Ukrainian bases, met 
the invading troops, and facilitated the takeover of strategic targets such as the Crimean 
parliament building.239 Analysts debated whether the new way of Russian aggression 
exemplified hybrid warfare with its emphasis on early preparation of the battlefield using 
all elements of national power, waging the war without declaring it, using a combination 
of unconventional forces, indigenous forces, and local militias during the invasion.240 
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Mark Galeotti describes Russia’s “new way of war” in Crimea and also in the eastern 
Ukraine as “simply a recognition of the [primacy] of the political over the kinetic—and 
that if one side can disrupt the others’ will and ability to resist, then the actual strength of 
their military forces becomes irrelevant.”241 The Russians successfully disrupted 
Ukraine’s will to resist.  
The operations in Crimea mainly centered around surprise and deception. The 
Russian soldiers remained incognito and acted with local self-defense militias until their 
objectives were achieved, which caused uncertainty about the real identity of the enemy 
on the Ukrainian side. That uncertainty may have prevented local reaction since 
bloodshed would have meant fratricide. The stealth and swiftness of the operation 
paralyzed the Ukrainian forces and enabled a near bloodless takeover followed the 
annexation of Crimea. 
D. ROLE OF SPETSNAZ 
The role the Spetsnaz played in the operations in Crimea and simultaneous 
protests in Ukraine remains obscure. The starting date of February 20, 2014 on “the 
Russian campaign medals ‘For the Return of Crimea’”242 may indicate that the ostensibly 
popular protests, which later led to violent clashes and Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych’s escape from Kiev to Crimea, were deliberately fabricated. According to 
Russian military analyst Anton Lavrov, “[t]he earliest date when the Russian operation is 
reliably known to have been in progress is February 22.”243 That same day, according to 
Galeotti and Anton Lavrov, the 45th Independent Spetsnaz Regiment (Otdelny polk 
spetsialnogo naznacheniya—opSn) of the Airborne Troops (Vozdushno-desantnye 
voiska—VDV, Moscow) and the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Tolyatti) were put on combat 
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alert.244 Two Special Battalions of the 16th Brigade Independent Special Forces 
Detachment (Otdelny otryad spetsialnogo naznacheniya—ooSn, effectively a Spetsnaz 
battalion, Tambov) left their base,245 and several other airborne units, including the 7th 
Airborne Assault Division in Novorossiisk, also received similar orders.246 
The Anapa airfield became the key logistics base of the operation in Crimea.247  
Located 50 km northwest from Novorossiisk,248 the airfield is where the 10th and 25th 
Spetsnaz brigades later boarded large landing ships and deployed into Sevastopol 
harbor249 along with many other reinforcements. As a part of a large drill scenario that 
President Putin ordered on February 26, “about 40 Il-76 military transports left the 
Ulyanovsk airbase on February 26 and 27.”250 News feeds claimed that “more than 10 of 
[the airplanes] landed in Anapa, and on February 28, some aircraft were spotted in 
Crimea.”251 Russia massed troops within a week disguised as a large drill. 
Meanwhile, self-defense militia groups started to form in Crimea, allegedly with 
Russian support or even instigation, “working through the marines of the 810th 
Independent Naval Infantry Brigade already based there.”252 Unidentified armed groups 
blockaded Ukrainian bases and paralyzed any potential reaction to the imminent seizure 
of the Crimean parliament building. On February 27, approximately 50 well-equipped 
men claiming to be the local militia and wearing civilian clothing, seized the Crimean 
parliament building. In the absence of any opposition, they took down the Ukrainian flag 
                                                 
244 Mark Galeotti and Johnny Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, ed. Martin Windrow, Elite 
206 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2015), 50; also see, Anton Lavrov “Russian Again: The Military 
Operation for Crimea” in Howard and Pukhov, Brothers Armed, 160. 
245 Galeotti and Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, 50. 
246 Howard and Pukhov, Brothers Armed, 160. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Galeotti and Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, 50. 
250 http://uwll.ru/landing/26-fevralya-2014/ cited in Howard and Pukhov, Brothers Armed: Military 
Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, 163. 
251 “Poleteli li v Krym Ulyanovskiye desantniki?” Breaking News Ulyanovsk, 
http://mosaica.ru/news/politika/2014/02/27/27856, cited in Howard and Pukhov, Brothers Armed, 163. 
252 Galeotti and Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, 50. 
 61
and hoisted the Russian flag over the building. The group identified themselves to the 
press as the “Russian-speaking Crimean population’s self-defense force.”253 However, as 
Galeotti describes it, “this well-armed and highly professional unit turned out to be the 
first deployment of operators from KSO [Russia’s new Special Operations Command: 
Komanda Spetsialnogo Naznacheniya], supported by elements of the VDV’s 45th 
opSn.”254 The operators turned the building into a fortress and unarmed, but well-
organized pro-Russian protesters, gathered outside to prevent local law enforcement 
forces from retaking the building. As the day went on, Russian troops continued to flow 
in by air, land, and sea. The logistics supply routes of the BSF made their infiltration 
from the sea easier. The Russian missile cruiser Azov carried about 300 operators, 
possibly from an old unit of the 810th Brigade, the 382nd Independent Marines Battalion 
from Temryuk.255  
After the initial shock and awe, the Russians’ intentions became more vivid, even 
while their presence was still in question. The lack of unit markings, signs, or license 
plates caused uncertainty about whether the invaders were themselves Russians or local 
groups armed by Russians. These heavily armed groups with armed personnel carriers 
proceeded to take over the Ukrainian airfields and bases in Crimea one by one. Although 
the Ukrainian troops had initial relative superiority, the government in Kiev did not issue 
orders to resist because it lacked trust in its own military, and that played a crucial role in 
the Russian takeover.256 
According to Lavrov, the special units that had joined the 810th Brigade by 
March 5 were the “3rd, 10th, 16th, and 22nd Independent Spetsnaz Brigades, the 25th 
Independent Spetsnaz Regiment, the 45th Independent VDV Spetsnaz Regiment, part of 
the 31st Independent VDV Airborne Assault Brigade, and small but very capable Special 
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Operations Forces (SOF) units.”257 Galeotti provides some similar, but less detailed, 
information. All those units represented several thousand troops in aggregate. Even so, 
the high number of special operators can be considered an “economy of force” action 
from the Russian perspective. With reinforcement from conventional fire support units, 
the Spetsnaz paralyzed most Ukrainian units in their bases and prevented any resistance. 
A quick political referendum at the end of March to secede from Ukraine followed. On 
March 21, 2014, one month after the first wave of unidentified armed men took to the 
streets, Crimea became Russian once again. 
E. RESULTS 
The operations in Crimea demonstrated that the Russian Spetsnaz provided 
Russian decision makers with a capable force to achieve Russia’s strategic goals while 
keeping the risk of escalation under control while expending limited resources. Troop 
numbers increased as the campaign progressed; however, the relative size of the 
conventional forces remained small. “Economy of force” was therefore achieved, thanks, 
in part, to the unresisting Ukrainian forces. Regarded as the Gerasimov model in practice, 
the operations in Crimea demonstrated how the Russians successfully implemented 
doctrinal changes into the field. 
Given the close proximity to Russian territory and a considerable number of 
Russian-speaking and Russian-looking people, in Crimea, Spetsnaz operators easily 
disguised themselves as the “local militia.” The inference that such a victory could be 
achieved outside the Russian near-sphere, however, would need further evaluation, 
especially given that there was no threat to Russian logistic routes in Crimea. That said, 
the effectiveness of Russian diplomacy to influence a third party in the pursuit of 
Russia’s strategic targets remains untested. On the other hand, the easy victory showed 
that extensive efforts took place prior to soften the battlefield and ensure or manufacture 
support prior to pushing armed operators to the front. 
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The BSF and other Russian units that were stationed in Crimea before the 
operation facilitated fast deployment and covert movement of the Russian soldiers. Their 
earlier preparations to conscript indigenous peoples of Crimea into informal, local, pro-
Russian militia groups became a game changer that created popular support to Russia. 
Also, the normal logistics procedures of the BSF covered the transportation of the special 
operators, who subsequently linked up with local groups to capture key buildings. That 
rapid and covert deployment of Russian soldiers increased the surprise factor, which 
played an important role in the Ukrainian soldiers’ indolence. Also, the Russians used the 
cover of securing the Olympic games in Sochi and the relevant large scale drills as ruse 
de guerre to hide their intentions in Crimea. Lastly, the ostensibly popular protests, 
allegedly facilitated by the Russians, intensified the fog of war prior to the operation. 
Another strategic outcome of the Crimean campaign is the fame that the Spetsnaz 
generated for themselves. Until then, the Spetsnaz did not draw much attention. By their 
actions in Crimea, they stood out as a powerful tool of Russian statecraft and sent a 
message to the world that it is too late to react when unidentified men surface on the 
streets. That worrisome reflection, which the perceivably flawless operation in Crimea 
created, will remain unchallenged until a Russian defeat proves it wrong.  
The final point is that Russia may be “punching above its weight” in its latest 
practices in Ukraine and Syria due to its weak economy and inferior conventional 
military capability compared to the West, as Galeotti states.258 Nevertheless, the 
annexation of Crimea suggests that the modernization of the Russian army paid off very 
well. As a result, Russia has developed a modern, capable, and prospering SOF as a 
strategic policy tool that Moscow can use domestically and abroad. The competency of 
the Spetsnaz poses a threat or at least a warning for NATO to take precautions in case 
they face a Spetsnaz unit in near future. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Motivated to investigate by the near-bloodless annexation of Crimea, the author 
researched the Russian Spetsnaz and their history to determine the extent of their 
involvement and utility in Russian wars. To find if a link between Russian and Soviet 
Spetsnaz exists, this thesis looks back to the 1950s, the period when the Spetsnaz were 
established. The Soviet and then Russian military literature helped grasp how Russians’ 
employment of conventional and unconventional forces has shifted toward the latter. The 
operations that the Spetsnaz conducted in Czechoslovakia, the two wars in Chechnya, and 
the annexation of Crimea show that Russian Spetsnaz became an indispensable 
instrument in Russian power projection.  
Colin Gray’s theory of strategic utility of special operations constituted the 
framework for the Spetsnaz’s contribution to Russian grand strategy. The Russians 
employ Spetsnaz for a variety of reasons. Most of these reasons coincide with Gray’s 
ideas about his theory of strategic utility. Gray’s theory includes “economy of force,” 
“expansion of choice,” “innovation,” “morale,” “showcasing of competence,” 
“reassurance,” “humiliation of the enemy,” “control of escalation,” and “shaping the 
future,” as elements of special operations’ strategic utility.259 The Russian decision 
makers considered “economy of force” and “expansion of choice” in nearly all of the 
campaigns mentioned in this thesis. Since the strategic parity and détente obliged the 
Russians to remain obscure in their aggressions, “control of escalation” likely was an 
important part of Russian decision making. The Russians vividly accomplished “shaping 
the future” in the Second Chechen War by training the Kadyrovtsy militias. Overall, the 
Russians’ use of the special operations complies with Gray’s theory. 
In order to compare theory and practice, this thesis examined three case studies. 
The first case is Operation Danube in Czechoslovakia, where the Spetsnaz spearheaded 
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the operation and facilitated the coup de main. The two Chechen wars provide the next 
case. Finally, the annexation of Crimea became the last and most significant case. 
In sum, the Russian Spetsnaz became an indispensable policy instrument in 
Russian statecraft due to their competency in operating swiftly and stealthily. As the 
Spetsnaz’s accomplishments grew, the Russians invested more in them, and the Spetsnaz 
underwent a series of reforms. With increased resources and capabilities, the more 
attractive they became. It appears that the Spetsnaz are positioned to continue to be a 
strategic tool in support of Russian policy objectives. 
B. TESTING HYPOTHESES 
The first hypothesis in this study identifies three conditions for Russian political 
and military decision makers to choose unconventional warfare over conventional: 
 The balance of interests in the target is in favor of Russia, 
 Conventional warfare would instigate a reaction by NATO, 
 The probability of success by unconventional means are high. 
In the three case studies, Czechoslovakia, Chechnya, and Crimea, the first and 
third conditions are valid. However, the second condition, in which NATO would react in 
the case Russia chooses conventional warfare, turns out to be no more than an 
assumption since conventional war never happened. NATO remains a deterrent against 
Russia waging a conventional war. Thus, because Russia is deterred from waging 
conventional war against NATO, the second condition may be regarded as valid, too.  
The second hypothesis claims that the Spetsnaz yield strategic outcome when they 
conduct covert operations in unconventional warfare. The facilitation of the operations by 
the pro-Russian networks inside the respective target countries, Czechoslovakia and 
Crimea, provides evidence to this claim. The consolidation of power through popular 
support throughout the operations also suggests that the Spetsnaz kept winning the hearts 
and minds of the locals. However, the First Chechen War constitutes a caveat to this 
hypothesis. In this war, the Spetsnaz formed the best fighting units, but their competency 
could not overcome the flaws in the overall strategy. In this war, the Spetsnaz did not 
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yield strategic results and suffered lots of casualties, mostly due to their incorrect 
employment as conventional units. As the Russians learned from their mistakes and 
recovered from defeat, an improved strategy enabled the Spetsnaz to yield strategic 
outcomes in the Second Chechen War. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Spetsnaz became the Soviet and Russian leaders’ first choice to avoid 
provoking the West and mostly exceeded expectations. The strategic utility of the 
Spetsnaz first surfaced in Operation Danube as they spearheaded the operation, and 
recently in their phenomenal performance in Crimea. First in the Prague Spring, then in 
the Afghanistan debacle, and lastly in the Arab Spring, the Russians combined all 
lessons-learned and the perceived interference of the West and then developed similar 
scenarios to support the uprisings against the government in Kiev. Consequently, the 
Russians annexed Crimea. Similar scenarios may be manufactured in Moscow to be used 
against countries of the former Soviet Union. Russian interests pose a threat to the 
contiguous countries who seek independence and stronger relations with the West. Russia 
may attempt in the future to shatter a NATO member that interferes in its interest areas. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, Russian conception, or misconception, of Western 
practices provide it with a self-righteous justification that it can use to wage war against 
its neighbors. While exerting its communist party control over the Soviet bloc, it also 
managed a strategic parity policy in order to not provoke the West. In this respect, the 
Russians employed a variety of policy tools in accordance with the threat it perceived. 
For example, the nuclear armament threat during the Cold War required no use of 
conventional forces to maintain strategic parity. At that time, Russian thinkers provided 
solutions such as “strategic missile forces,” which would eventually win a nuclear war if 
one began. However, the idea of mutual destruction obliged the Russians to consider 
other options rather than a nuclear war. Thus, the stealth requirement under those 
circumstances increased the significance of the Spetsnaz during the Cold War.  
Throughout post-WWII Russian history, the changing perceived threats and 
diminishing resources caused the Spetsnaz to stand out as an essential tool for Soviet and 
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Russian leaders. In parallel to the increasing need for special operations, the Spetsnaz 
came into focus in Russian military literature. While the Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
Doctrines did not address directly the use of special operations, the Gerasimov Doctrine 
did. Gerasimov mentioned the significance of special operations and SOF, which turned 
them into key players in Russian strategic thinking. 
Operation Danube in Czechoslovakia showed that the Spetsnaz were competent 
enough to accomplish surgical operations in a politically sensitive situation. In the 
presence of a massive army, the Spetsnaz captured Czechoslovak leaders alive and 
transported them to Moscow for peace talks. Capturing the leaders alive was an important 
part of the operation to prevent further escalation. Also, Czechoslovak leaders’ inability 
to protect themselves weakened their hand at the negotiation table and they had to 
conform to the Soviet terms. This was made possible mostly by the swiftness and stealth 
of the operations conducted by the Spetsnaz. Therefore, Soviet SOF were able to 
demonstrate “control of escalation,” and “shaping the future,” in addition to “economy of 
force” and “expansion of choice,” master claims outlined by Gray. 
The Chechen Wars illustrate that Spetsnaz do not always yield strategic outcomes, 
especially if they are not employed as part of a coherent plan. In the First Chechen War, 
the Spetsnaz contributed little due to the lack of proficiency of the conventional Russian 
Army. Spetsnaz could not compensate for the general incompetence of the Russians, even 
though they were the best unit to fight an urban war. They simply became the choice of 
the Russian leaders because they remained the only unit capable of fighting in such a war. 
In the second war, however, the lessons learned from the first war paid off, and the 
Russians returned to Grozny as a competent force to break the Chechen resistance. The 
Spetsnaz provided strategic results. In aggregate, after the two wars, the Spetsnaz met 
most of the claims outlined by Colin Gray.  
Lastly, the annexation of Crimea showed that the Russian Spetsnaz excelled at 
covert operations after experiencing several reforms. There remains a risk that the 
Spetsnaz may conduct similar operations in any country contiguous to Russia, where the 
environment reflects the case in Crimea. In sum, as the annexation of Crimea 
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demonstrated, Russia has developed a modern, capable, and prospering SOF that can 
yield strategic outcomes in Russia’s favor and pose a credible threat to its adversaries. 
As a counter argument, as the First Chechen War demonstrated, the Spetsnaz are 
not always the solution by themselves. The Spetsnaz’s competency could not compensate 
for the general flaws in the battle plans or the general insufficiencies of the conventional 
army. However, the Russians learned from their mistakes and recovered to win the 
Second Chechen War. Moreover, the Spetsnaz did not only help win the war, they also 
facilitated future stability in Chechnya. The Spetsnaz-trained local Kadyrovtsy militias 
have become the Chechen law-enforcement forces to ensure safety in Chechnya. 
In conclusion, the Russian leaders employ the Spetsnaz when the operations 
require stealth and swiftness to hide indicators of their use beforehand. Given the ongoing 
clashes in Ukraine’s Donbass region and Russia’s war against ISIS, the Russian Spetsnaz 
will continue to develop while providing an “expansion of choice” to the Russian leaders. 
However, since Russia’s power projection expanded beyond its near sphere, as is the case 
in Syria, the Spetsnaz threat also expanded to countries beyond the near abroad. The 
Russians perceive the use of conventional means against a NATO member would invoke 
a reaction by NATO. However, that remains insufficient to prevent Russian leaders from 
using SOF elements in NATO countries. It behooves NATO to clearly communicate its 
commitment to its members to Russia, otherwise Russia may exploit any weakness to 
shatter the foundations of the alliance. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As mentioned above, to prevent Russian interference in NATO and its members’ 
interests, NATO should clearly pledge to take necessary actions, including a proportional 
military response by invoking “Article 5,” in a case where Russia endangers any of its 
members’ sovereignty even when using special forces to do so. NATO should consider 
that Russia has fought against NATO since its foundation, and an insignificant fracture in 
a member state may result in a break in NATO’s structure. That said, NATO should 
focus on further research about the Spetsnaz and should share the findings with its 
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members. More research and dissemination of the inferences will help nations to build 
more competent SOF units that will be aware of and can neutralize the Spetsnaz threat. 
As for Turkey, the Russian interests in the Middle East may collide with 
Turkey’s, causing problems between the two countries. Increasing tension in Syria and 
Iraq among many proxies may ultimately turn into a Turkish-Russian confrontation. In 
the case of an escalation, Russia may use Spetsnaz units inside Turkey, especially the 
ones that look more Turkic or Turkish. Given the widespread territory that the Soviets 
once ruled and Turkish ties with the Turkic states in Asia, recruiting Turkish-speaking 
and Turkish-looking soldiers from old Soviet bloc countries in Asia would not be 
impossible for Russia. If this is the case, Russians will use pro-Russian Turks inside 
Turkey to weaken the constitutional structure and power instruments and fabricate 
protests or uprisings to wreak havoc prior to a military operation. Afterward, if ties 
between NATO and Turkey weaken, as several pundits warn may happen, either the 
Turkish government or the opposition may ask Russia to help solve the problems arising 
from the fabricated chaos, being unaware of Russia’s involvement in that very problem. 
These scenarios occurred in Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and Crimea. Turkey should 
consider that the Russians will not align with Turkey unless Russia wins its more than 
six-decade long war against NATO in return. In this respect, Turkey, a member of NATO 
since 1952, should cooperate more and work closely with NATO in the current conflict 
zones to prevent covert Russian aggression. 
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